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I. INTRODUCTION
The underlying purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)2 is to provide
investors with full disclosure of corporate information.3 Under this
consumer protection framework, preliminary merger or acquisition
negotiations must be disclosed when a corporation is under a duty to
disclose and negotiations are deemed "material" within the meaning
of Rule l0b-5 as promulgated under the 1934 Act.4 Despite the
prodisclosure philosophy underlying securities laws and regulations,
corporate managers intentionally withhold news of preliminary nego-
tiations.' The lack of a clear "materiality" standard requiring disclo-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) [hereinafter 1933 Act].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1982) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
3. For the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, see infra notes 24-36 and
accompanying text.
4. For the text of Rule 10-b5, see infra note 34 and accompanying text. By its terms,
Rule lOb-5 does not require disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations or any other specific
information. A regulatory disclosure requirement may be imposed, however, in certain
circumstances:
The question of whether a particular fact must be disclosed under rule l0b-5
requires the analysis of two distinct issues. First, is there a duty to disclose the
fact, and second, is the fact material. Much of the confusion in the case law
stems from the failure of the courts to distinguish between these inquiries.
Goelzer, Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations-Truth or Consequences, 46 MD. L.
REV. 974, 975 (1987). This Comment focuses on how the definition of materiality affects the
timing of disclosure. For a discussion of the specific duties that trigger the regulatory disclo-
sure requirement, see infra note 97.
Failure to conform to SEC imposed disclosure requirements is actionable under the anti-
fraud provisions of the 1934 Act-Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S.
Ct. 978, 983 (1988) (holding that a private cause of action exists for a violation of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, and that such lawsuits constitute an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934
Act's requirements). The Supreme Court previously has addressed several elements of a Sec-
tion 10(b) or Rule lob-5 claim. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 436 U.S. 646 (1983) (duty to disclose);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (duty to disclose); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) ("manipulative or deceptive" requirement of the statute); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter, intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) ("in connection with the
purchase or sale" requirement of the Rule). Violations of SEC rules, however, do not neces-
sarily create a private right of action. See In re Penn Cent. Secs. Litig., 494 F.2d 528, 540 (3d
Cir. 1974) (denying existence of a private cause of action under Section 13(a) of the Exchange
Act).
5. Managers refrain from making disclosures either to facilitate a transaction or to use
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sure has exacerbated the paucity of information reaching the market.6
As a result, competition for takeover information is widespread. 7
The determination of "materiality" and, consequently, the tim-
ing of when preliminary takeover discussions must be disclosed signif-
icantly affect the competing interests of all the participants in the
national securities markets.' Initially, corporate managers are
affected by the timing of disclosure because, as long as information
remains undisclosed, they can benefit personally by trading on their
insider knowledge. 9 Moreover, in order to facilitate a merger or an
acquisition, corporate managers prefer to delay disclosure, thus
preventing a bidding war with another suitor and discouraging specu-
lative purchasers from driving up the target stock price.'" Individual
stockholders and market professionals" are also affected by the tim-
ing of disclosure because they compete for potential takeover stock
premiums. 12 By spotting revealing trends in market behavior, market
professionals identify a potential target company and aggressively
purchase its stock before unsuspecting individual investors become
informed. 13 If merger or acquisition negotiations were disclosed at an
early stage, however, individual investors likely would be privy to the
same information as their institutional counterparts and thus would
the nonpublic information for their own benefit. For a discussion of the need for
confidentiality during merger or acquisition negotiations, see infra notes 154-62 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of managers' self-interest during preliminary takeover
negotiations, see infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of manager uncertainty as to when to disclose information due to the
lack of a readily followed and enforced materiality standard, see infra notes 112-22 and
accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the market for information, see infra notes 37-80 and
accompanying text.
8. See generally Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder
Wealth, 8 J. FIN. EcON. 105 (1980) (discussing the daily abnormal returns to stockholders of
suitor and target companies in both completed and cancelled merger proposals that result in
response to public announcements).
9. For a discussion of the empirical evidence demonstrating the vast extent of insider
trading, see infra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the costs and benefits associated with concealing the existence of,
negotiations, see infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
11. As. discussed in this Comment, "market professionals" refers to underwriters and
investment bankers, such as arbitrageurs. Generally, "market professionals" refers to anyone
who has an informational advantage, by virtue of costly in-house research, over individual
investors.
12. For a discussion of takeover premiums, see infra note 38 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the competition between individual investors and market professionals for the
spoils of the battles for corporate control, see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the shift in stock ownership from individual investors to
arbitrageurs preceding the disclosure of a potential merger or acquisition, see infra notes 44, 48
and accompanying text.
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not be at such a competitive disadvantage.' 4
The ideal disclosure model is one that addresses several concerns.
Such a model must provide a clear definition of materiality that can
be easily followed by corporate managers. The ideal standard also
must ensure parity of information among all investors, limit the time
that insiders and market professionals can benefit on their nondis-
closed information, and promote investor confidence by the fair and
efficient operation of the securities markets. In Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son, 1' the United States Supreme Court stated that "[a]n omitted fact
[concerning negotiations] is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable [investor] would consider it important in deciding
how to [invest]."' 6 The Basic definition of "materiality" has a direct
impact on the flow of information to investors, the efficiency of securi-
ties markets, investor confidence, and the proliferation of insider trad-
ing. Moreover, because this definition does not offer a bright-line
"materiality" standard,' 7 various questions concerning when prelimi-
nary negotiations are "material" arise at each step in the fast-paced
battle for corporate control.' 8
This Comment analyzes the various models of disclosure of pre-
liminary merger negotiations, their effect on the securities markets,
and their relation to the congressional objective of full disclosure.
Section II examines the competition for information regarding merger
and acquisition negotiations and the legislative intent underlying the
disclosure provisions of the 1933 Act, 1934 Act, and modern securi-
14. For a discussion of the costs and benefits associated with an early disclosure standard,
see infra note 171-87 and accompanying text.
15. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
16. Id. at 983 (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
17. For a discussion of corporate management's practical need for a "materiality"
standard in the form of a bright-line rule, see infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
18. Professors Jensen and Ruback view the market for corporate control as the arena in
which management teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources. Jensen &
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control.b The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 5
(1983). In their article, they state that there are three basic forms of a takeover-mergers,
tender offers, and proxy contests. Jensen and Ruback explain:
In mergers or tender offers the bidding firm offers to buy the common stock of
the target at a price in excess of the target's previous market value. Mergers are
negotiated directly with target manager's [sic] and approved by the target's board
of directors before going to a vote of target shareholders for approval. Tender
offers are offers to buy shares made directly to target shareholders who decide
individually whether to tender their shares for sale to the bidding firm. Proxy
contests occur when an insurgent group, often led by a dissatisfied former
manager or large stockholder, attempts to gain controlling seats on the board of
directors.
Id. at 6-7.
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ties legislation.' 9 Section III explores the evolution of the case law
concerning disclosure of preliminary negotiations.2° Section IV then
examines the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Basic.2' In
addition, Section V analyzes the costs and benefits of various disclo-
sure standards. 22 Finally, Section VI concludes that a disclosure stan-
dard triggered by specific events common to all takeovers increases
certainty among corporate managers, maximizes shareholder value,
and embodies the congressional objective of full disclosure.23
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE MARKET
FOR INFORMATION
A. The Policies Underlying Early Securities Legislation
Prior to the 1933 Act and during the stock market crash of 1929,
investors generally purchased securities under the philosophy of
caveat emptor.24 Because there were no federal enactments or ade-
quate state laws safeguarding investors from fraudulent practices,
securities frequently were offered without any disclosure of facts rele-
vant to the buyer's investment decision. 25 The 1933 Act responded to
this need for information and had three objectives: 1) to provide
investors with full disclosure of material information concerning ini-
tial public offerings of securities; 2) to protect investors against fraud;
and 3) to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing
through the imposition of specified civil liabilities.26
19. See infra notes 24-87 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 110-31 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 132-229 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 230-43 and accompanying text.
24. The fraudulent and deceptive retailing of securities to finance the country's railroad
network following the American Civil War provided the impetus for the creation of securities
laws. Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Law, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1974).
Many of these railroad securities were either worthless, diluted, or sold based upon the false
promise that the railroad would pass through the buyer's small town. Id. Subsequently, a few
states began adopting securities legislation designed to protect investors from promoters of
highly risky securities. Id. Yet it was not until 1929, following the crash of the stock market,
that members of Congress recognized that many of these state laws were inadequate.
Consequently, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
25. See Mofsky, supra note 24, at 3-4.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933). Commenting on one of the
early pieces of "New Deal" legislation, President Roosevelt said that the 1933 Act was "but
one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors." Id. at 1-2. Additionally, a
Representative from the House commented that i[the theory upon which [the 1933 Act] has
been drawn is to give the public complete information as to the security offered for sale." 77
CONG. REC. 2931 (1933). This philosophy of full disclosure is also the basis of the 1934 Act.
See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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Although the 1933 Act provided for disclosure of information
regarding initial public offerings of securities, there was still a need to
protect investors regarding those securities transactions that occurred
after initial offerings. Thus Congress enacted the 1934 Act largely to
protect investors from manipulation of stock prices.27 To prevent
such manipulation, the 1934 Act regulates transactions on the securi-
ties exchanges and imposes reporting requirements on companies
whose stock is listed on national exchanges. 2  The 1934 Act also was
intended to protect the public by providing for full disclosure in
securities transactions.29  By requiring more complete disclosure,
Congress intended to create securities markets that operated with a
sense of fairness 30 and parity of information among all investors.3 "
As part of the 1934 Act, Congress created the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which is charged with administering
the federal securities laws, and provided with an arsenal of flexible
27. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934).
28. Id.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
30. The notion of fairness in the securities markets is not limited to the idea that all
investors receive the same information. One court explained that fairness embodies a larger
concept:
The core of Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that
all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities
transactions. It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing
public should be subject to identical market risks,-which market risks include,
of course the risk that one's evaluative capacity or one's capital available to put
at risk may exceed another's capacity or capital.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
The idea of fairness or equity is largely the policy basis underlying insider trading regula-
tions. If insider trading exists, individual investors will not entrust their resources to a market-
place they do not believe is fair. For a discussion of the impdrtance of limiting insider trading
in order to foster confidence in market integrity, see infra notes 165-70 & 179-81 and accompa-
nying text.
31. Subsequent to the passage of the 1934 Act, the United States Supreme Court, in SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), acknowledged that ensuring full
disclosure was a fundamental purpose underlying many securities regulatory enactments. Id.
at 186 (referring to the following statutes: 1933 Act; 1934 Act; Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa to 77bbbb; and Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52);
accord Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). Capital Gains involved an investment adviser who, after
having purchased shares of a particular stock, sent out an investment letter recommending
that his clients buy the stock. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 182-83. The adviser did not tell his
clients that he himself had purchased such stock. Id. After the clients began buying the stock
and the price went up, the adviser sold his nondisclosed shares at a profit. Id. Specifically, the
Court held that the adviser had breached his fiduciary duty to his clients, and that, in the
Securities legislation, Congress intended to replace the initial market philosophy of caveat
emptor with full disclosure. Id. at 189 (referring to H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
quoted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953)).
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enforcement powers. 32 Under the rule-making authority provided by
Section 10(b),33 the SEC created Rule lOb-5 to regulate, among other
things, the disclosure of preliminary merger and acquisition negotia-
tions. Rule lOb-5 provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, ....
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 4
Rules such as lOb-5 can be promulgated under Section 10(b)
only if they are designed to protect consumers. 35 Thus, the consumer
protection objective of Section 10(b) reveals the intent of Congress to
replace the initial market philosophy of caveat emptor with full
disclosure.36
B. The Market for Information
Complicated takeover bids, leveraged buy-outs, and mergers are
redefining the perceived limits of a Wall Street "megadeal." '37
32. See 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9, 19, 21; 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u.
33. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
35. Section 10(b) authorizes the creation of rules and regulations "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982)
(emphasis added).
36. H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, (1933).
37. Until recently, the largest acquisition in history was Chevron Corp.'s $13.2 billion
purchase of Gulf Oil Corp. in 1984. See Smith & Anders, Year of the Megadeal Is Upon Us,
Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at C3, col. 3. In 1986, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR)
completed the largest leveraged buy-out of Beatrice Companies for $6.2 billion. See Helyar,
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Because they often generate substantial stock price premiums,38 these
transactions have stirred speculation in many takeover target compa-
Morris & Swartz, RJR Nabisco Chief Considering Buy-Out of Concern for $176 Billion, or $75
a Share, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
But in 1988, the "year of the megadeal," several transactions came close to and surpassed
these previous records. For instance, Kraft accepted a $13.1 billion offer from Phillip Morris.
See Freedman & Gibson, Kraft Accepts a Sweetened Offer of $13.1 Billion From Phillip Morris,
Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1988, at A3, col. 1. The most highly publicized megadeal of 1988,
however, was a record-setting takeover contest for RJR Nabisco Inc. won by a group led by
KKR. The struggle for corporate control began when RJR's management announced it was
contemplating a $17.6 billion buy-out bid. See Burrough & Helyar, RJR May Get a Third
Offer, Topping Others, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1988, at A3, col. 1. In response, KKR made a $20.6
billion tender offer, which, in turn, triggered a management bid of $21.16 billion. Id.
Subsequently, management proposed an even higher bid of $23 billion, while a group led by
First Boston Corp. and Resource Holdings Ltd. said it would organize a proposal valued at
over $27.14 billion. See Burrough & Helyar, First Boston's RJR Offer Has Tight Timetable,
Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1988, at A3, col. 4. Finally, RJR Nabisco Inc.'s outside directors rebuffed
a management offer worth $25.76 billion and accepted KKR's bid valued at $25.07 billion.
See Burrough & Helyar, Buy-Out Bluff How Underdog KKR Won RJR Nabisco Without
Highest Bid, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
Merger and acquisition activity has continued throughout 1989 at a robust pace. After a
protracted legal battle instigated by Paramount Communications Inc. and disgruntled Time
Inc. shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to block Time Inc.'s attempt to buy
Warner Communications Inc. for $14 billion. See Hilder & Landro, Paramount Withdraws Its
Hostile Offer As Time Begins Its Purchase of Warner, Wall St. J., July 25, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
Consequently, Paramount Communications Inc. withdrew its $12.2 billion hostile takeover
attempt for Time Inc., announcing that it had no plans to make a run at the combined Time
Warner Inc. Id. Additionally, in what could accelerate a wave of corporate restructurings in
Europe, Anglo-French corporate raider Sir James Goldsmith, British financier Jacob
Rothschild, and Australian businessman Kerry Packer organized a $21.2 billion offer to buy
B.A.T. Industries PLC. B.A. T-Man Caper. Predator Becomes Prey As Goldsmith Seeks
British Conglomerate, Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at Al, col. 6. The proposed buy-out as
currently structured would not only be the second biggest corporate-finance transaction, next
only to the $25.07 billion acquisition of RJR Nabisco Inc., but it would also be four times
larger than any other takeover attempted in Europe. Id.
38. In a takeover, shareholders of the target company ordinarily receive a premium-a
substantial, short-term return on their stock. Several researchers have quantified the average
takeover stock price change-net of market-wide price fluctuations-that mergers and
acquisitions effect on the stock prices of participating firms. One study reports that, in the first
quarter of 1988, successful takeover bidders in cash tender offers paid an average premium of
54.8% over the pretakeover stock price. Predictable Business Values, MERGERS &
AcQUISITIONS, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 25. The figures were obtained from an unpublished report
by P. Michael Kelly, Vice President of American Appraisal Associates Inc. Id. Historically,
Nathan and O'Keefe find that takeover premiums during 1974-85 were approximately twice as
large as those occurring during 1963-73. Nathan & O'Keefe, The Rise in Takeover Premiums.-
An Exploratory Study, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 101, 101 (1989) ("The mean cash tender takeover
premium rose from 41% to 75%, the mean cash merger premium rose from 29% to 70%, and
the mean stock merger premium rose from 32% to 67%.").
Additionally, Professors Jensen and Ruback empirically found 13.3% to 33.96%
historical, abnormal returns for target companies in a takeover. Jensen & Ruback, supra note
18, at 7-8. Specifically, Jensen and Ruback reported the following percent changes in the stock
prices of the firms involved in successful and unsuccessful takeover attempts:
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nies,39 have riveted the attention of individual investors, and have
caused market professionals at investment banks to scrutinize care-
fully rumors and news of merger negotiations.' Accordingly,
STOCK PRICE PREMIUMS
SUCCESSFUL UNSUCCESSFUL
Target Bidder Target Bidder
Tender Offers 30% 4% -3% - 1%
Mergers 20% 0% -3% -5%
Proxy Contests 8% n/a 8% n/a
n/a = Not Applicable
Id. From Jensen and Ruback's evidence, in a successful merger, for example, Target Co.
hypothetically merges and becomes part of Bidder Co. Ordinarily, in order to entice Target
Co.'s shareholders and directors to agree to the merger with Bidder Co., Bidder Co. presents
Target Co., on average, with a 20% premium-an offer 20% greater than the price of Target
Co. stock prior to any merger discussions. When the merger is complete, Jensen and Ruback
do not notice any resultant effect, either positive or-negative, on the valuation of Bidder Co.
This indicates that the primary financial gain immediately resulting from a merger is realized
by the shareholders of target companies in the short run. See also Bradley, Desai & Kim,
Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their Division Between the Stockholders of
Target and Acquiring firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 31 (1988) (Competition among bidding firms
increases the returns to targets and decreases the returns to acquirers to a level that is not
significantly different from zero.). In the end, however, the bidder may realize an increase in
value reflecting the perceived greater ability of the merged corporation to utilize combined
resources and create higher earnings. Id. For a discussion of the financial gains associated
with synergy, see infra notes 134, 136 and accompanying text. On the other hand, if merger
negotiations fail between Bidder Co. and Target Co., the stock of Target Co. will fall 3%
below the market price before negotiations were entered into, while Bidder Co. stock falls 5%
below the prenegotiations level. Jensen & Ruback, supra note 18, at 7-8.
Although acquiring firms usually prefer tender offers because they provide a timing
advantage over the other two methods, all three forms are used to accomplish the same end-
corporate control. Freund explains that "the principal advantage of using.., tender offers to
accomplish negotiated deals is for the purchaser to gain control of the seller faster. Time is
precious here; the quicker control shifts, the surer the deal is to happen, the less likely [the
purchaser will be injured ifl competing bids . . . surface." Freund, Mergers and Acquisitions,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1985, at 13, 23, col. 3 (Freund prepared the article as a ten-year update to
his book ANATOMY OF A MERGER.). Freund, however, does not take into consideration that
competitive bidding, while potentially damaging to the initial bidder, may increase the even-
tual sales price and maximize target shareholder investment value.
Although all three methods are used to achieve corporate control, this Comment primar-
ily addresses disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations. While provisions of the Williams
Act specifically attack some abuses associated with disclosure of tender offers, no such particu-
lar legislative enactment regulating mergers exists. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)
(1982); Comment, Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 WASH.
L. REV. 81, 91-92 n.68 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Disclosure].
39. Apparently, the size of a transaction is no longer seen as a limitation to attempting a
takeover. Shortly after the multi-billion dollar RJR Nabisco and Kraft transactions, there was
speculation in the stocks of companies long considered too large to be acquired. See Smith,
Size as Takeover Immunity Dies a Sudden Death, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at Cl, col. 3.
Investors recently have been considering Sears, K Mart, J.C. Penney, Chrysler, Mobil,
Eastman Kodak, and Digital Equipment. Id.
40. When the management of RJR Nabisco announced it was considering a $75 a share
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although corporate managers intentionally delay disclosure of ongo-
ing negotiations,4' information concerning takeover bids and mergers
is of critical importance to all investors.42
While corporate managers seek to maximize stock value to avoid
becoming targets of takeover attempts,43 stockholders and market
professionals compete for potential merger stock premiums.4 In the-
ory, limited public information regarding potential takeovers is
equally available to both individual investors and market profession-
als. Under current market conditions, however, there is no such par-
ity of knowledge.45 Market professionals gain an informational
advantage through extensive in-house research.46 By either tracking
unusual market activity created by insider trading or receiving non-
public information from corporate insiders, market professionals can
identify undervalued corporations and often can anticipate takeovers
before a public announcement regarding preliminary negotiations.47
leveraged buy-out, the disclosure sent RJR Nabisco stock soaring $21.75, from $54.875 to
$76.625, amid speculation of higher offers. Thus, without an actual offer, stock speculators bid
up the price of RJR Nabisco above the proposed offer price. See Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at
A1, col. 2.
41. For a discussion of the benefits of keeping preliminary negotiations confidential, see
supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
42. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of when the interests of corporate managers often are diametrically
opposed to those of shareholders, see infra notes 60, 77 and accompanying text.
44. See Brown, Corporate Secrecy, The Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of
Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 93, 149 n.207 (1986). Although 60% of the shares
of publicly traded companies are owned by individual investors, in a takeover, shareholders
sell to arbitrageurs and other speculators. Ricks, Murray, Power & Steptoe, Taking Stock.
Changes Since Crash Can't Prevent a Repeat, But Might Soften One, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1988,
at Al, col. 6. In fact, market professionals, rather than individual investors, generally tender
between 60% and 90% of the shares received by a suitor. See Hamilton, Some Reflections on
Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269, 294 n.101 (1969).
There are two periods during which individual investors are most likely to sell their shares
during the course of a takeover-before and after disclosure of preliminary takeover
discussions. If shares are sold after disclosure, an individual investor is presumed to be making
an informed investment decision based on a balancing of the risks and rewards of the potential
takeover.
If individual investors sell their shares before public disclosure, however, their actions are
not based on any ascertainable or rational fact or theory. In fact, when initially purchasing
shares, many individual investors place automatic stop loss or sell orders with their brokers to
be exercised when the stock value falls below or exceeds a certain value. If brokers are not
made aware of a potential takeover from either their own or their company's in-house
research, the shares of an individual investor automatically will be sold without the individual
investor ever being informed of a potential takeover premium.
45. For a discussion of the abnormal returns earned by market professionals, see infra note
38 and accompanying text.
46. For a discussion of how market professionals gain valuable investment information
through market "noise," see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
47. Market participants trade either on the basis of knowledge that relates specifically to
the financial prospects of a corporation, or in reaction to snippets of information called
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Information is critical; therefore, the timing of public disclosure of
merger negotiations determines who will have an informational
advantage and who will be the recipient of potential takeover
premiums.
'noise"-information that does not directly relate to the corporation, but rather to unusual
trading activity in its stock. See Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 529 (1986). Black explains that
trading on noise rather than on firm-specific information generally is unprofitable:
In my model of financial markets, noise is contrasted with information. People
sometimes trade on information in the usual way. They are correct in expecting
to make profits from these trades. On the other hand, people sometimes trade on
noise as if it were information. If they expect to make profits from noise trading,
they are incorrect.
Id. at 529. Professors Larcker and Lys, however, contend that noise trading based specifically
on the market activity of corporate insiders provides traders with incentives for costly "noise"
information acquisition. Larcker & Lys, An Empirical Analysis of the Incentives to Engage in
Costly Information Acquisition-The Case of Risk Arbitrage, 18 J. FIN. EcON. 111, 124-25
(1987).
Profitable, insider noise information is available in two principal forms. First, valuable
information can be learned by following the market activity of corporate insiders. See, e.g.,
Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974) (examining the perform-
ance of a security subsequent to either a transaction by an insider, a large transaction of an
insider, or months in which many insiders of a company transact); Lorie & Niederhoffer, Pre-
dictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 35 (1968) (investigat-
ing stock performance following months of intensive trading in which there are at least two
more buyers than sellers or at least two more sellers than buyers among the insiders of a
company). Following the trading activity of corporate insiders may become more difficult
under a current SEC proposal that would require trading filings of only the officers listed on a
company's proxy statement, instead of the current reporting of all officers. See, e.g., Dorfman,
Some Investors See Red in SEC's Plan to Modify Insider Reporting, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1989,
at Cl, col. 3 ("Some investors are up in arms about a Securities and Exchange Commission
proposal they say would reduce the usefulness of a widely used stock-picking tool.").
Second, traders can be tipped-off as to possible upcoming events by tracking the bid-ask
spread in the stock of a particular corporation. See, e.g., Glosten & Harris, Estimating the
Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 140-41 (1988) (providing empirical
evidence that the bid/ask spread is positively correlated with the exposure of market-makers to
traders who are better informed); Glosten & Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985) (con-
cluding that a bid-ask spread implies a divergence between observed returns and realizable
returns, if observed returns are approximately realizable returns, plus what the uninformed
anticipate losing to the insiders); Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Effi-
ciency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 190-91 (1986) (confirming a positive relation between profitable
market activity by insiders and the bid-ask spread in that security). Professor Seyhun explains
how the bid-ask spread provides significant information:
[Commentators suggest that there is] a positive relation between the informed
traders' [insiders'] abnormal profits and the bid-ask spread in that security. Prof-
itable trading by informed traders imposes abnormal losses on all opposing trad-
ers, including the market-maker. Consequently, the market-maker is forced to
charge a higher bid-ask spread to all traders to help offset his systematic losses to
informed traders.
Id. at 190-91. Consequently, an increase in the bid-ask spread-the cost that market-makers
impose on non-insiders to protect themselves from insider trading-provides valuable predic-
tive suggestions.
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1. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN NONPUBLIC INFORMATION
Nonpublic information is valuable and can be considered a capi-
tal good or an asset that can be transferred, sold, or exchanged.48 In
the absence of voluntary corporate disclosures, market participants
can obtain needed investment information by conducting or purchas-
ing independent research.49 Under the law and economics theory, the
possession and exploitation of an informational advantage creates val-
uable property rights and has resultant macroeconomic effects.50
Thus the allocation of the initial property rights in nonpublic infor-
mation to either insiders, market professionals, or individual investors
has various macroeconomic ramifications that should be examined in
determining the appropriate timing of regulatory disclosures.5'
Market participants have varying access to firm-specific informa-
tion that potentially affects stock prices.52 For example, insiders have
the best access to information regarding corporate developments that
have not been publicly disclosed. After insiders, market professionals,
through the use of costly, in-house research, have a better opportunity
than do individual investors to discern likely corporate activities. Yet,
no matter where the law initially allocates the property rights to valu-
able information through disclosure regulation, market participants
will exploit or reallocate those rights, by selling such information to
the most productive user or highest bidder, so that the value of the
nonpublic information is maximized and exhausted.53 The imposition
of an early disclosure requirement on public corporations disturbs the
equilibrium which provides a flow of information to the most produc-
tive user by limiting the value of the informational advantages that
insiders casually acquire through their positions and that market pro-
fessionals obtain through a deliberate and costly search.54 The alloca-
48. See Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683 (1980); see also Carlton & Fischel, Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV.
857, 866 (1983); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions. 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 21, 64
(1980); Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 79,
94-95 (1987).
49. See Kitch, supra note 48, at 716-23; Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and
the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-16 (1981); Morgan, supra note 48, at 95, 99-101.
50. See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (Papers
and Proceedings 1967).
51. See, e.g., Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REV. 377 (1989)
(analyzing the regulation of insider trading by examining the allocation of initial property
rights in firm-specific information).
52. See generally Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1449 (1986) (describing how information is efficiently transferred among market
participants based on allocation efficiency).
53. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
54. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 49, at 15 ("A duty to disclose is tantamount to a
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tion of information affects the wealth of all market participants, the
incentive to search for and discover nonpublic information, and the
efficiency of accurate stock pricing."
There are various economic consequences of either allocating the
property rights in nonpublic information to corporate insiders or
requiring that the intrinsic value of material, nonpublic information
be shared by all market participants through an early, full disclosure
requirement. For instance, several commentators assert that, if cor-
porate managers were partially compensated by being allowed to util-
ize the value of the nonpublic information that they discover through
their positions, the corporation and its shareholders would benefit due
to the generation of certain managerial incentives. 6 By increasing the
value of the corporation through new developments or product ideas,
corporate managers also would be able to receive a profit by trading
on the basis of this positive insider information. Professor Cox
explains how allowing corporate managers to trade on nonpublic
information would benefit managers, stockholders, and the general
economy:
[M]anagers who are free to trade will be stimulated to generate
new information in order to provide themselves with further
opportunities to gain by trading prior to disclosing the value-
increasing event. The owners [shareholders] also benefit because
such value-enhancing information means new developments, new
markets, and other corporate events that increase the value of the
firm.
5 7
Thus insider trading may stimulate management productivity, crea-
requirement that the benefit of the information be publicly shared and is thus antithetical to
the notion of a property right which ... always requires the legal protection of private
appropriation.").
55. See, e.g., id.
56. See Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting. A Critical Response to the "Chicago
School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 649 (1986) (discussing insider trading as a means of
extraordinary compensation that provides productivity inducements for corporate managers)
[hereinafter Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting]; Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the
Production of Information: Theory and Evidence, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 475, 475 (1984) (same)
[hereinafter Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the Production of Information]. Compare
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 48, at 869-72 (advocating insider trading as a form of managerial
compensation) with Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting, supra, at 652-53 ("Because
[corporate bonus programs] already confer large financial rewards upon managers, it is
extremely doubtful that those in the managerial ranks feel that they are seriously
undercompensated and are clamoring for insider-trading profits as an incentive reward for
further efforts."); Levmore, In Defense of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 101, 104 (1988) ("[AII the positive incentive qualities of insider trading can in fact
be matched by other tools-and these other tools, such as stock options, [explicit bonuses,
promotions, and lateral job opportunities,] are explicit and calculable by employers, or
shareholders, and are therefore preferable to insider trading.").
57. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting, supra note 56, at 649.
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tivity, and motivation, while providing resultant macroeconomic
rewards.
On the other hand, allowing managers to control and utilize non-
public information creates several problems. First, although manag-
ers are motivated to create and disclose positive information, negative
information will rarely reach the market,5" thus reducing market effi-
ciency due to inaccurate stock pricing. Managers have a disincentive
to announce adverse information because the "bad news" may
threaten their job security and reduce the value of their corporate
stock holdings by generally lowering the market price of the corpora-
tions' stock.59 Second, if managers can conceal positive information
or engage in strategically unprofitable "bad behavior" to intentionally
cause a downturn in the corporation's stock price, the managers will
have created a unique personal opportunity to purchase their conse-
quently undervalued corporation through a leveraged buy-out
(LBO). 60 Although the "self-interested LBO" represents the extreme
of management misconduct, there is still a great temptation for man-
agers to manipulate artificially the price of corporate stock to benefit
personally from volatile price swings.6'
Moreover, mergers and acquisitions are unique situations where
insider-trading compensation incentives do not apply. Unlike new
corporate projects or research, takeovers do not increase the current
value of the corporation; that is, the net asset value of the target cor-
poration is not increased. Specifically, the takeover premium only
represents either the existing hidden value in a corporation not
reported in financial statements, positive information concealed by
managers, or the possible synergy value that might be generated in the
58. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98
HARV. L. REV. 747, 785 (1985) ("At some point, the company's short-run wish to maintain a
high stock price will create a strong temptation to impose a wall of secrecy, to the detriment of
persons buying the stock.").
59. Id.
60. Levmore, supra note 56, at 104-07. While considering the efficiency of leveraged buy-
outs or "going private," Professor Levmore explains:
[A]fter the firm "goes private," the managers will own all the equity in the firm,
and may, therefore, work harder .... [T]hese managers may have waited until
they developed information that good fortune was around the corner before
booting the public shareholders whose funds helped develop this information and
employ these managers in the first place. "Going private" is, after all, simply a
huge trade by insiders.
Id. at 106. "Going private" refers to a transaction in which shareholders are convinced to
accept cash for their shares, while the business is continued by officers, directors, or large
shareholders. A leveraged buy-out (LBO) is a specific method of "going private." In an LBO,
management acquires all the shares of a public corporation through a privately held, outside
corporate entity.
61. Id. at 104-07.
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future by a combination with a suitor.62
Although allowing managers to control the dissemination of
information regarding preliminary takeover negotiations may create
inefficient incentives for self-interested transactions, commentators
suggest that insider trading is an indirect method of communicating
information to the securities markets.63 By trading on signals created
by insider trading, market professionals promote general market effi-
ciency by acquiring and consequently bidding-up undervalued
stock.64 Specifically, arbitrageurs promote market efficiency by
purchasing shares of corporations that are undervalued and predis-
posed to a takeover. Moreover, some commentators are opposed to
disclosure regulation because it removes market professionals' infor-
mational advantage and, consequently, the incentive to engage in the
costly informational search that fosters efficiency.
65
This fear that mandatory disclosure rules may harm market effi-
ciency by removing the financial incentive for market professionals to
search for nonpublic information, however, is unwarranted. Market
62. For a discussion of takeover premiums and takeover synergy, see infra notes 38, 136
and accompanying text.
63. Compare Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of
Dirks v. SEC, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 133 (1984) (advocating that insider trading is a
valuable and flexible communications device) with Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting,
supra note 56, at 646 ("Certainly price changes will occur more quickly and efficiently through
disclosure of the material nonpublic information than through the manager's use of personal
resources and time to trade in his firm's stock."). For a discussion of how market professionals
obtain investment information from market "noise" created by insider trading, see supra note
47 and accompanying text.
64. See Diamond & Verecchia, Information Aggregation in a Noisy Rational Expectations
Economy, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 221 (1981); Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 47. Compare H.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 80-90 (1966) (The increase in accurate
public information from "noise" and thus market efficiency is the principal justification for
allowing insiders to trade on confidential information.); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law
Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565 (1970) (same) [hereinafter Manne, Insider Trading and
the Law Professors] with Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient. An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 707 (1988) ("The cases
of insider trading and index futures trading illustrate how, in many circumstances, the current
preoccupation with nurturing efficient stock market pricing seems unwarranted .... at least
misdirected.").
65. See, e.g.. Morgan, supra note 48, at 100. Professor Morgan stated:
[By either using] the information for his or her own trading benefit ... or ... by
deciding to mount a takeover bid for the target company, . . . the ability of the
analyst to profit from the analysis and conclusions that he or she has produced
will depend on the ability of the analyst to use the information while it is still
secret, for once the information becomes widely known whatever trading
advantage it would have provided (and whatever value it once had) is lost.
Id.; see also Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Dis-
close Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973) (arguing that market professionals
should have property rights in the information that they discover and produce because the
information is created by their own efforts).
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professionals have superior access to nonpublic information and pos-
sess a profitable economic incentive to engage in costly information
acquisition regardless of disclosure rules. Even under the late disclo-
sure practices during the period from 1977 to 1983, one empirical
study reports that arbitrageurs were profitable and had significant
economic incentives for engaging in informational searches based
solely on their own trading following the disclosure of takeover nego-
tiations.66 Specifically, in the time period between the first public
announcement of a takeover proposal and the final disclosure of a
consummated deal, arbitrageurs were generating substantial positive
returns through superior information discovered via in-house
research.67 Although an early, full disclosure requirement would
eliminate their informational advantage during the time preceding
public disclosure of ongoing negotiations, market professionals would
continue to promote market efficiency by engaging in costly in-house
research because the period following disclosure still offers a signifi-
cant economic opportunity. Consequently, the usual "property
rights" justifications for allowing insider trading-performance moti-
vations for management and informational search incentives for mar-
ket professionals-are not germane to the special case of mergers and
acquisitions.
On the other hand, there are beneficial market effects that would
be noticed if individual investors, by virtue of mandatory disclosure
regulations, were allowed to have access to what has heretofore been
nonpublic information in the context of corporate control battles. By
making preliminary takeover negotiations public information, the
benefits of confidential information will be short-lived, if not illegal.
Moreover, there will be a greater likelihood of parity of information
66. Larcker & Lys, supra note 47, at 111.
67. Professors Larcker and Lys explain that, even following disclosure of negotiations or
an initial takeover proposal, considerable economic incentives exist for market professionals:
Our results indicate that [arbitrageurs] are able to acquire information that is
superior to public information about the outcomes of acquisition proposals. ...
[Arbitrageurs] generate substantial positive returns on their portfolio position.
This empirical evidence is consistent with the proposition that security prices are
sufficiently noisy to provide traders with incentives for costly information
acquisition. ...
The uncertainty surrounding corporate reorganizations (e.g., merger, tender
offer, or voluntary liquidation proposals) produces a spread between the share
price at formal announcement date and the price per share offered in the
proposal.... [Arbitrageurs] engage in costly information acquisition to resolve
some of the uncertainty associated with the value of the firm undergoing a
reorganization. In particular, [arbitrageurs] attempt to generate information that
enables them to assess the "correct" security price of a company being
reorganized.
Id. at 112-13.
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among individual investors, market professionals, and corporate
insider traders. Additionally, mandatory disclosure promotes effi-
ciency and benefits all investors by providing market information
about obscure corporations not widely followed.68
Although mandatory disclosure seems to be a means of generat-
ing vital market information, many commentators argue that securi-
ties laws, like disclosure rules, produce few benefits and considerable
costs. 69 Specifically, under the free market for information theory,
regulation is costly and unnecessary because corporate managers,
seeking to maximize shareholder value, will release information vol-
untarily up to the point that the marginal benefits of disclosure equal
the marginal costs.70 Because market participants desire information
to make investment decisions and "assume the worst" in the absence
of released information, a company that wishes to raise capital
through public markets has an incentive to and can profit by provid-
ing voluntary disclosures. 7' Additionally, subscribers to this theory
68. Langevoort, supra note 58, at 784. One commentator proposed a disclosure
convention that operates by each publicly traded corporation having a "public relations
answer person." This corporate representative would have access to all high-level corporate
executives and would be responsible for quickly and accurately responding publicly to virtually
all inquiries from the press, individual investors, market professionals, and the Securities and
Exchange Commissi6n. Note, Corporate Officers' Duty to Speak Truthfully in Response to
Market Rumors: Levinson v. Basic, Inc. Holds Preliminary Merger Negotiations to Be Material
Facts, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 627, 654-55 (1987). The problem with this disclosure convention is
that it is triggered by an inquiry. Obscure issues may escape public scrutiny, while larger
corporations will be bogged down with administrative implementation. In general and in the
context of mergers and acquisitions, mandatory disclosure generates market information about
all publicly traded corporations.
69. See, e.g., Bentson, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market.- An Evaluation of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973) (advocating the free
market theory) [hereinafter Bentson, Required Disclosure]; Bentson, Required Periodic
Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1471 (1979) (same) [hereinafter Bentson, Required Periodic Disclosure]; Bentson, The
Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCT. REV. 515 (1969) (same);
Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projections.- A Law and Economics
Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197, 1209 (1987) (discussing whether the compliance costs
associated with mandatory disclosure are justified when securities prices reflect the impact of
the information before it is filed with the SEC); Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (advocating the free market
theory) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors].
70. Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the Production of Information, supra note 56, at
475 n.3 (and sources cited therein.).
71. Easterbrook and Fischel provide the following example of a company that wants to
issue new securities to illustrate corporate managements' motivation to provide voluntary
disclosures:
The firm has a project . . . that it expects to be profitable. If the firm simply
asked for money without disclosing the project and managers involved, however,
it would get nothing. Investors would assume the worst, because, they would
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believe that the principles underlying mandatory disclosure are empir-
ically not supported. 72
2. THE SPECIAL CASE OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS UNDER
THE FREE MARKET THEORY
Commentators disagree as to whether, in the absence of regula-
tion, the free market theory would provide the investing public with
sufficient "soft information, '73 such as appraisals of assets, projected
dividends, and future earnings. 74  The free market theory, however,
should not be applied to disclosure of preliminary merger and acquisi-
tion negotiations because takeover discussions differ from ordinary
soft information in two important aspects. First, unlike other types of
reason that if the firm had anything good to say for itself it would do so. Silence
means bad news. A firm with a good project, seeking to distinguish itself from a
firm with a mediocre project (or no project at all), would disclose the optimal
amount of information. That is, it would disclose more and more so long as the
cost of disclosure ... was worthwhile to investors as a whole .... The process
works for bad news as well as for good. Once the firm starts disclosing ... [i]t
must disclose the bad news with the good, lest investors assume that the bad is
even worse than it is.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, supra note 69, at
683. Cf. Bentson, Required Disclosure, supra note 69 (discussing the economic principles and
motivations underlying voluntary disclosure); Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Laws and Take-
over Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323 (1980) (same).
72. Specifically, beginning with the seminal research of Professor Bentson, the free market
theorists have argued that securities regulation does not provide increased public confidence in
the markets by preventing fraud, protection for unsophisticated investors, and an increased
supply of truthful information. Bentson, Required Disclosure, supra note 69, at 153: see also
Fishman & Hagerty, Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency, 44
J. FIN. 633, 643 (1989) (suggesting that the competition for the attention of traders provides
firms with the incentive to disclose too much information, and that mandatory disclosure of
additional information only aggravates the problem).
73. Professors Steinberg and Goldman explain the difference between "soft" and "hard"
information:
Traditionally, the securities laws have required disclosure of "hard" information,
that is, factual, objectively verifiable data. "Soft" information, on the other hand,
predominantly focuses on forward-looking statements, such as projections,
forecasts, and predictions. Moreover, soft information need not necessarily relate
to expectations regarding the future, but may include any statement that cannot
be factually supported, whether due to a lack of substantiating data or because
the information consists primarily of subjective evaluations or opinions.
Steinberg & Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure Obligations-An Analytical Framework for
Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad News, 46 MD. L. REV. 923, 934-35 (1987).
74. Compare Bentson, Required Periodic Disclosure, supra note 69, at 1471 (advocating the
"free market" theory); Dennis, supra note 69, at 1209 (same); Easterbrook & Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, supra note 69, at 683 (same) with Coffee,
Market Failure and the Need for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984) (a
critique of the empirical evidence supporting the "free market" theory); Seligman, The
Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 n.22 (1983)
(same).
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soft information, takeovers commonly involve an abnormal, short-
term stock premium.75 This significant financial reward creates a
temptation for insider trading76 and, consequently, undermines the
basic assumption of the free market theory-that corporate managers
try to maximize shareholder wealth in deciding whether to disclose
information and that they do not act for their personal benefit. 77 Sec-
ond, although investors may or may not utilize the soft information
currently provided in required disclosures, 78 news of a takeover dra-
75. For a discussion of the substantial premiums associated with mergers and acquisitions,
see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the empirical evidence supporting the existence of insider trading
before the disclosure of a potential takeover, see infra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
77. Professors Mikkelson and Ruback explain that the interests of corporate managers
often are diametrically opposed to those of shareholders. Managers who have small
shareholdings may resist a takeover due to self-interest:
These managers profit less from a successful takeover and therefore other factors,
such as the prospect of losing their job, provide an incentive to oppose takeovers
that are in the stockholders' interests. This suggests that opposition to takeovers
can be remedied by increasing share ownership by the management team.
Mikkelson & Ruback, Takeovers and Managerial Compensation: A Discussion, 7 J. ACCT.
ECON. 233, 238 (1985). As a result, because they often depose current management, takeovers
may serve as an external control mechanism that limits managerial departures from maximiza-
tion of stockholder wealth. Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms, 1 J.
FIN. ECON. 303, 331 (1974) (Merger activity is a way of eliminating less efficient, unproductive
corporations.) Despite this beneficial effect, the Bush administration is considering "major
tax-law changes to combat last year's binge of corporate acquisitions financed with high-yield,
high-risk 'junk' bonds." Birnbaum, Congressional Action on LBOs Slows to Dragging Feat,
Wall St. J., March 9, 1989, at Cl, col. 3. Professor Mandelker warns against such governmen-
tal action: "Efforts to limit merger activity may result, therefore, in misallocation of resources,
and regulation may lead to a less efficient economy." Mandelker, supra, at 331. But see supra
note 60 (a discussion of managers' self-interested LBOs).
Furthermore, Professors Jensen and Warner assert that management, acting out of self-
interest, also implements defensive tactics in response to takeover bids which actually injure
shareholder returns: "Evidence on management actions taken to forestall takeovers is incon-
sistent with the view that management always acts in shareholders' interest. Share prices
decline on target-manager announcements of defensive restructuring in response to hostile
takeovers and on announcement of poison-pill antitakeover measures." Jensen & Warner, The
Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors, 20 J. FIN.
EcON. 3, 4 (1988). For a discussion of other effects of management self-interest, see Friend &
Lang, An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-Interest-on Corporate Capital Struc-
ture, 43 J. FIN. 271, 280 (1988) ("It is shown that the level of [corporate] debt decreases as the
level of management investment (shareholding) in the firm increases, reflecting the greater
nondiversifiable risk of debt to management than to public investors for maintaining a low debt
ratio.").
78. Compare Bentson, Required Disclosure, supra note 69, at 153 (Corporate SEC filings
and disclosures do not produce significant stock price fluctuations or adjustments.);
Rendleman, Jones & Latane, Empirical Anomalies Based on Unexpected Earnings and the
Importance of Risk Adjustments, 10 J. FIN. EcON. 269, 269 (1982) ("[R]oughly 50% of the
adjustment of stock returns to unexpected quarterly earnings occurs over a 90-day period after
the earnings are announced.") with Reinganum, Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing, 9 J.
FIN. EcON. 19, 19 (1981) (Examining unexpected quarterly earnings information led to a
finding that subsequent abnormal. investor returns were not observed.).
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matically affects the stock price unlike any other type of information79
and, when provided, undoubtedly is used by investors in making
investment decisions.8 0 As a result, the benefits of a mandatory dis-
closure system are intensified in the context of mergers and acquisi-
tions because market participants consistently hunger for and actually
utilize this type of information. Consequently, in this Comment, the
free market theory is discussed when appropriate, but is not given
primary consideration.
C. The Continuing Relevance of Full Disclosure
Congress' enactment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 (ITSA)81 and the Williams Act in 196882 demonstrates the con-
tinuing legislative commitment to furthering the philosophy of fair-
ness and full disclosure embodied in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The
stated purpose of ITSA, for example, is to uphold "the public's expec-
tations of honest and fair securities markets where all participants
play by the same rules." 3 To achieve this purpose, ITSA provides for
injunctions and penalties, both civil and criminal, to prevent insider
trading. 84 Similarly, in order to provide all participants in the securi-
ties markets with greater information, Congress passed the Williams
Act to broaden disclosure requirements for tender offers.85 Thus the
79. For a discussion of the substantial premiums associated with mergers and acquisitions,
see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of how approximately half of the market reaction to a takeover occurs
on the day of the first public disclosure, see Keown & Pinkerton, infra note 127, at 866.
Professor Ng accurately characterized the tension between the objective of fostering an
efficient allocation of information and promoting parity among all market participants:
Our analysis suggests that if information is disclosed to only a selected few, it
would be much easier for the government (as a knowledgeable outsider) to
influence resource allocation. Although the distribution of resources may be
Pareto-optimal, it is possible for a particular group of individuals to continually
benefit at the expense of other individuals. The issue ...becomes a trade-off
between Pareto-optimality and other measures of social welfare.
Ng, Information Accuracy and Social Welfare Under Homogeneous Beliefs, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 53,
69-70 (1975).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1984).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
83. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1983).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1984).
85. Cf Hanson Trust PLC v. SMC Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1985). Concerning the
problem solved by the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act and the need for full
disclosure, the Hanson court stated:
Without knowledge of who the bidder is and what he plans to do, the
shareholder cannot reach an informed decision. He is forced to take a chance.
For no matter what he does, he does it without adequate information to enable
him to decide rationally what is the best possible course of action.
Id. at 55 (quoting S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967)); see generally Hazen, Rumor
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original objectives underlying the 1933 and 1934 Acts and, in particu-
lar, Section 10(b) serve as the touchstones of modern securities
legislation.
The two major stock exchanges, through the formulation of rules
patterned after the congressional intent of fairness and parity of infor-
mation, also advocate full disclosure. The New York Stock
Exchange, for instance, imposes a duty upon every listed company to
"release quickly to the public any news or information which might
reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its securi-
ties."86 The rules of the American Stock Exchange take a similar
approach: "The exchange considers that the conduct of a fair and
orderly market requires every listed company to make available to the
public information necessary for informed investing; and to take rea-
sonable steps to ensure that all who invest in its securities enjoy equal
access to such information."87
III. THE EVOLUTION OF CASE LAW DEFINING "MATERIALITY"
Although congressional enactments and the two major securities
exchanges recognize the importance of early disclosure of "material"
information, including information regarding preliminary merger
negotiations, the courts generally have been hesitant to require such
early disclosure.8 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, s9 however, the United
States Supreme Court provided the foundation for a requirement of
earlier disclosure. In Basic, the plaintiff Max Levinson sold his shares
in Basic Inc. at the same time that Basic was falsely denying that
preliminary merger negotiations were underway. 90 When a subse-
quent merger between Basic Inc. and Combustion Engineering, Inc.
was consummated, Levinson sued Basic Inc. alleging a violation of
Rule lOb-5 for falsely responding.to inquiries concerning the merger
negotiations.9' The Supreme Court held that preliminary negotia-
tions are "material" and thus must be disclosed if there is "a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider [the
existence of such negotiations] important in deciding how to
Control and Disclosure of Merger Negotiations or Other Control-Related Transactions: Full
Disclosure or "No Comment"--The Only Safe Harbors, 46 MD. L. REV. 954, 955 (1987) ("The
major thrust of the Williams Act ... is disclosure in order to assure an informed market.").
86. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 202.05 (1986).
87. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE § 401 (1983).
88. Courts generally have required disclosure only when a deal has been nearly finalized;
that is, when the price and structure of the forthcoming transaction have been determined. See
infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
89. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
90. Id. at 981.
91. Id.
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[invest]." 92 The Court remanded Basic to the Sixth Circuit for a rul-
ing on when the merger discussions became material in this particular
case.
93
By requiring the disclosure of tentative information, like prelimi-
nary negotiations, in those instances in which a corporation had
recently been allowed to remain silent, Basic represents a substantial
departure from past judicial interpretation of Rule lOb-5.94 . In order
to better understand Basic, this Comment explores the evolution of
case law construing the "materiality" of merger negotiations for dis-
closure purposes.
A. The Old Bright-Line Rule: Agreement-In-Principle
Prior to Basic, a conflict existed among the federal courts of
appeals as to when merger negotiations became material. Some
courts considered preliminary merger negotiations immaterial as a
matter of law until there was "an agreement in principle ... on the
price and structure ... [of the] proposed merger."95 Under this stan-
dard, corporations did not inform shareholders of ongoing negotia-
tions until extremely late in the process. Such late disclosure,
however, appealed to corporate management for two reasons. First,
the "agreement-in-principle" standard was a bright-line rule affording
92. Id. at 983 (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
93. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993.
94. In the years immediately preceding Basic, although never advocated by Congress,
some courts considered preliminary negotiations material and thus ripe for disclosure only
when an agreement-in-principle had been reached. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169,
1174-78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d
751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Reiss v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205-07 (3d
Cir. 1982). Basic, of course, did not adopt the agreement-in-principle standard.
Before the agreement-in-principle cases, the primary case defining the scope of protection
afforded by Rule lOb-5 was SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit held that
corporate managers owe a duty to reasonable and speculative investors to disclose possibiliti2s,
as well as established facts. Id. at 849-50. The Court stated that "information is material
when knowledge of [a] possibility . . . would certainly have been an important fact to a
reasonable, if speculative, investor in deciding whether he should buy, sell, or hold." Id. at
849-50 (emphasis added). Basic departs from Texas Gulf Sulphur by limiting both the
disclosure duty and the class of investors to whom the duty is owed: "[a]n omitted fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood [rather than a "possibility"] that a reasonable [not
"speculative"] [investor] would consider it important in deciding how to [invest]." Basic, 108
S. Ct. at 983 (emphasis added) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976)). Consequently, Basic departs from both recent cases and past judicial precedent.
95. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1215 (1985); see also Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174-78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 157 (1987); Reiss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983);
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205-07 (3d Cir. 1982).
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managers maximum flexibility to entertain preliminary negotiations
without making disclosure, while providing certainty regarding the
boundaries of their respective disclosure duties and related liabili-
ties.96 Although the corporation may have been under a duty to dis-
close, preliminary takeover negotiations could be hidden from the
public as information that was not material, and thus not ripe for
disclosure.97  Second, this standard arguably facilitated mergers or
acquisitions by allowing vital information of a pending transaction to
remain confidential.98 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit99 and several
lower courts I I held, similar to the holding and standard of Basic, that
96. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
97. The determination of whether a public disclosure is mandated requires a two part
analysis: whether the corporation is under a duty to disclose and whether the information in
question is material. See supra note 4. Aside from the issue of materiality, a disclosure
obligation arises generally in four particular circumstances. See Goelzer, supra note 4, at 975-
76. Goelzer asserts that, "[ajlthough there are some exceptions, a public company is generally
entitled to maintain confidentiality, even if the negotiations are material." Id. at 975-76.
The first circumstance that gives rise to a duty to disclose is when the SEC rules and
regulations require disclosure of certain information. The 1934 Act requires three reports and
filings. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982). Registered corporations must file Form 10-K annually with
the SEC within ninety days of the end of a fiscal year. 17 C.F.R §§ 240.13a-1, 240.15d-1,
249.310 (1988). Corporations also must file Form I0-Q within forty-five days of the end of a
quarter. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13, 249.308a (1988). Finally, corporations must
file Form 8-K within 15 days after the occurrence of certain events: change in control,
acquisition or disposition of a significant amount of assets, bankruptcy or receivership, change
of certifying accountant, and resignation of directors. 17 C.F.R §§ 240.13a- 11, 240.15d-11,
249.308a (1988). Item 5 of Form 8-K requires a company to report any information that
would be of material importance to securities holders. For a discussion of specific line item
disclosure requirements, see generally Brown, supra note 44, at 101-14.
The second circumstance that gives rise to a duty to disclose occurs when issuers trade
their own stock. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984); Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). For a more
complete description of this obligation, see infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
The third circumstance for disclosure occurs when prior public announcements, although
true when made, become false or misleading. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Similarly, courts have
held that once a corporation makes a statement, a duty exists to correct those statements still
"alive" in the market. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd
on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
The fourth circumstance is when market rumors are attributable to the issuer. See
Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); State Teachers
Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981). Specifically, this obligation arises when corporate
insiders disclose material information to selected individuals, who subsequently trade on the
nonpublic information. In such a circumstance, a corporation may be under a duty to disclose
the same information to the entire market.
98. See infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
99. See SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1984); SEC v. Geon Industries,
Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849-50
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
100. See Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
1989] 1043
1044 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1021
merger negotiations crossed the materiality threshold prior to an
"agreement-in-principle." 0
'
B. The Supreme Court: Materiality is Fact Sensitive
Prior to Basic, tension existed between the original congressional
mandate of early disclosure of information for the protection of inves-
tors and the subsequent judicial tolerance of late disclosure for the
benefit of corporate managers and their suitors. In considering the
question of when merger negotiations become "material" under Rule
lOb-5, the Basic Court recognized this tension and adopted the "mate-
riality" standard used in evaluating proxy solicitation provisions
under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act.12 This standard had been enun-
ciated in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 103 the leading case in
the proxy area, involving omissions on a proxy statement, in which
the Court concluded that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote."' 1
4
(finding that a statement denying knowledge of merger discussions could be materially
misleading) (dicta); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 439 F. Supp. 721, 744-45
(E.D. Va. 1980) (same); SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,004 (S.D.N.Y. April 15, 1985) (same); In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No.
22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985) (same)
[hereinafter Carnation Release].
101. Although an earlier disclosure standard would protect small investors from the market
power exerted by market professionals, such a standard should also provide corporate
managers with clear guidance as to their duty to disclose. For a discussion of the need for a
bright-line materiality standard for use by corporate management, see supra notes 112-22 and
accompanying text.
102. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988) ("We now expressly adopt the TSC
Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 context."). Moreover, prior
to Basic, two courts of appeals had applied the definition of materiality of Section 14(a), as
amended, of the 1934 Act to Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5. See McGrath v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 466 & n.4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
103. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). In TSC Industries, National Industries bought 34% of TSC
Industries common stock and put five persons on the TSC board of directors (including the
chairman of the board and chairman of the executive committee). Id. at 440. Next, National
proposed to buy the remainder of TSC in a stock-for-stock exchange. Id. at 440-41. The
board of TSC approved the transaction while the five National directors abstained. Id. As a
shareholder of TSC, Northway, Inc. brought a cause of action alleging that the joint proxy
statement issued by TSC and National to solicit TSC shareholder approval was false and
misleading and in violation of Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9. Id. at 442-43. Although the Supreme
Court eventually held that the statements or omissions were not material, the complaint
alleged that the proxy statement failed to disclose that: 1) the President of National was the
chairman of the board of TSC, id.; 2) the vice president of National was the chairman of the
TSC executive committee, id.; and 3) National may have been in "control" of TSC by virtue of
National owning 34% of TSC's common stock. Id. at 441-42.
104. Id. at 449.
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The Basic Court applied the TSC Industries materiality standard
to takeover investment decisions. The standard, however, does not
provide guidance as to whether and when a "reasonable investor"
would consider preliminary merger negotiations significant in invest-
ment decisions. The Basic Court tried to address this problem, recog-
nizing that "materiality" will depend upon "a balancing of both the
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activ-
ity."' °5 The more probable a takeover or the greater its potential
magnitude, the more likely it is that the information will have to be
disclosed.
This balancing standard does not provide a bright-line rule for
management, but depends upon the particular facts of each case. Ini-
tially, to assess the probability that a transaction will occur, the Basic
Court first suggested that the factfinder look to certain indicia of
interest in the transaction at the highest corporate levels.' 0 6 Accord-
ingly, supporting evidence may include instructions to investment
bankers, board resolutions, and actual negotiations between principals
or their intermediaries.° 7 These events, common to all takeovers, are
objective questions of fact and, unlike the factors weighing upon the
magnitude of the transaction, provide useful guidance to managers as
to when disclosure may be appropriate.10 8 Second, in considering the
magnitude of the transaction, the Court observed that the factfinder
should analyze the size of the corporate entities involved and the size
of potential premiums over market value.' 09 Because the issues of the
size of the entities and of potential premiums are subjective questions
of fact, the "materiality" of particular transactions inevitably will
vary from case to case.
IV. BASIC RULING CREATES ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
The Basic standard has several practical problems. Under this
new fact-sensitive materiality test, corporate managers will not know
how to act. Thus the standard creates uncertainty as to when prelimi-
nary negotiations must be disclosed and therefore leaves corporate
managers without clear guidance as to the potential for civil and crim-
105. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 987 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Although a determination as to whether such events have actually occurred is an
objective exercise, until a court addresses precisely which indicia of interest are relevant or
meaningful, the selection of the specific bright-line events will be subjective.
109. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 987.
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inal liability for withholding information."' Additionally, this mate-
riality standard does nothing to avert the alarming increase in insider
trading activity. " I I
A. Managers Do Not Know How to Behave
The materiality standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic
creates confusion among corporate managers. The bright-line "agree-
ment-in-principle" test rejected by the Court appealed to corporate
managers because it provided clear guidelines and boundaries. The
standard was also easy to enforce."12
Under Basic, however, materiality is a question of fact to be
determined by the circumstances of each case. Although they have
no clear guidance as to when negotiations become material, corporate
managers must make decisions that implicate enormous liability
risks." 13 As one commentator observes, "an uncertain materiality test
creates difficult counseling situations and liability concerns, particu-
larly given that any adjudication will be determined with hind-
sight." '  Management liability based on an uncertain, case-by-case
determination of materiality may create a disincentive for corpora-
tions to enter into takeover negotiations, especially given the painstak-
ing efforts that are required to adhere to unclear disclosure rules and
the potential for enormous liability. If managers decide not to pursue
takeover discussions when appropriate and in the best interests of
their corporations, shareholders will seek alternative investments that
will maximize their return, and investors generally will place less reli-
ance on the securities markets.
Under the probability/magnitude balancing test inherent in the
Basic standard, a corporate manager must consider the magnitude of
110. Because there is little case law defining this new materiality threshold, the conditions
or circumstances giving rise to a duty to disclose material information regarding preliminary
negotiations have yet to be fully developed. Although this paucity of relevant case law should
be temporary, the ad hoc nature of the Basic test limits corporate managements' incentive to
enter negotiations because of the uncertainty regarding potential, immense liability.
111. For a discussion of how the Basic probability/magnitude standard fails to limit the.
time during which insiders can exploit the value of their nonpublic information, see infra notes
123-31 and accompanying text.
112. See A Tough Call on Disclosure, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, July/Aug. 1988, at 21;
Ehlinger, Can Merger Negotiations Still Be Kept Under Wraps?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
Sept./Oct. 1988, at 45; Roundtable: Weaving Communications in the Acquisition Process,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, July/Aug. 1988, at 24 [hereinafter Roundtable].
113. In addition to criminal and civil liability under Rule lOb-5 for failing to disclose
information, managers also can be held liable for undue delays committed in bad faith. See
Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
114. Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 73, at 929.
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the transaction and the probability that the transaction will occur, in
order to determine if preliminary merger negotiations must be dis-
closed. I II Regarding the magnitude component of the test, the Basic
Court suggested no clear method for managers to measure the magni-
tude of the transaction except for stating that managers should con-
sider the size of the merging corporate entities and the potential stock
price premium." 6 Measuring the size of a corporate entity is prob-
lematic because there are many different standards which can be uti-
lized. Such measurement, for example, could be based upon the
number of employees, the number of shareholders, the amount of
gross earnings, or the value of corporate assets. Similarly, the mea-
surement of a potential takeover premium-either the dollar amount
of price fluctuation or the percent ratio of change in original stock
price"' 7-is problematic because its assessment is a subjective deter-
mination based largely on market uncertainties.
Furthermore, by requiring an evaluation of the expected stock
price premium, the Court set too low a threshold of materiality. In
most cases, the potential premium will be so large that any investor
will want to be aware of any activity that could dramatically affect the
stock price.' Indeed, considering the potential stock premium
alone, all merger negotiations may be considered material.' Judge
Friendly, in considering the magnitude of a transaction under the
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 120 probability/magnitude approach,
115. The Basic Court stated that materiality depends upon "a balancing of both the
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in
light of the totality of the company activity." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct 978, 987 (1988)
(quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
116. Id.
117. Id; see also supra notes 38, 120 and accompanying text (discussing takeover premiums
and the difficulty in their measurement).
118. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (empirical data concerning the magnitude of
the abnormal returns received by target shareholders). The stock of RJR Nabisco Inc., for
example, received a 96.8% takeover premium - the difference between the Kohlberg, Kravis,
Roberts & Co. (KKR) $108 per share offer and the stock price of $54.875 thirty-nine days
before the KKR deal was finalized. See Burrough and Helyar, Buy-Out Bluff: How Underdog
KKR Won RJR Nabisco Without Highest Bid, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
119. There are also several problems with measuring the potential premium. A stock
premium can be defined by either a certain dollar or percentage gain in a particular stock.
Moreover, the realized gain can be attributed to several different periods-a one-day stock
price rise or a two-week period to account for insider trading which may not be accounted for
in one-day snapshots. The definition must account for the fact that approximately half of the
market reaction to a takeover occurs before the public announcement, and most of the
remaining increase is realized on the day of the announcement. For a discussion of empirical
evidence reflecting the vast proportions of insider trading, see infra notes 123-31 and
accompanying text.
120. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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wrote:
Since a merger in which [a corporation] is bought out is the most
important event that can occur in a ... corporation's life, to wit, its
death, we think that inside information, as regards a merger...
can become material at an earlier stage ... even though the mortal-
ity rate of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high. 121
Thus, in the context of a potential stock price premium, mergers
could and should be deemed material as a matter of law once there is
any possibility of a combination. The importance of a merger or
acquisition and its potential impact on the stock price compels such a
result. If such a proposal were adopted, only the probability of a spe-
cific takeover, as determined by the relevant indicia of interest in the
transaction, would be examined to determine if disclosure was
necessary.
Because managers must adhere to the law and thus to the Basic
holding, they cannot wait for the courts to clarify the duty to disclose
preliminary takeover negotiations as redefined by Basic. Therefore,
managers must either make complete disclosure, possibly generating
great costs at the expense of shareholder earnings,1 22 or withhold dis-
closure, at the risk of incurring substantial liability. This dilemma
may restrain corporate managers from engaging in mergers or acqui-
sitions. Moreover, if managers do not seek to consummate mergers or
acquisitions when appropriate, shareholders may unwittingly forgo
stock price premiums that they might have realized had there been a
combination.
B. Insider Trading Flourishes
Rule lOb-5 prohibits insider trading by establishing a fiduciary
duty prohibiting an issuer from gaining a profit through the use of
nonpublic corporate information at the expense of its shareholders.
12 3
According to Rule lOb-5, an issuer in possession of material, nonpub-
lic information may not trade its own stock.' 24 Thus, if preliminary
merger negotiations are "material," issuers must either abstain from
121. SEC v. Geon Industries, 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976).
122. For a discussion of the costs associated with making a disclosure, see infra notes 185-
87 and accompanying text.
123. For a discussion of the relationships that give rise to a duty to disclose material
information or to refrain from trading, see infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
124. See Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987); Jordan v. Duff and Phelps,
Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.
1982); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Flour Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd in relevant part, 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981).
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trading their stock or disclose the negotiations. 125
Under the philosophy of full disclosure, many insiders, outsiders,
investment bankers, and their respective employees have been the tar-
get of recent SEC enforcement efforts. 126 Despite these enforcement
efforts, insider trading flourishes. Professors Keown and Pinkerton
statistically confirm that merger negotiations are poorly held secrets,
and that trading on this nonpublic information by insiders and market
professionals abounds. 127 Specifically, they report that "uncontrolled
abuse of Rule lOb-5" begins five to eleven days prior to the announce-
ment date of a takeover. 128 The impact is widespread, with approxi-
mately half of the market reaction to a takeover occurring before the
first public announcement. 129  Thus insider trading is rampant and
negatively affects those investors not in possession of this critical
information. 130
125. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314-18 (6th Cir. 1976); Fischer v. Plessey Co.,
559 F. Supp. 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Corporate insiders trading stock for their personal
account are under a duty to disclose all material facts to prospective purchasers or sellers.
This "disclose or abstain" rule is derived from an interpretation of the anti-fraud rules
stemming from In re Cady Roberts. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
126. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp.
425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., No. 88-6209 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(settlement discussions ongoing); SEC v. Seigel, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 247 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 13, 1987); SEC v. Cecola, No. 86 Civ. 9735, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1986); SEC v.
Pomerantz, (1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,008 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11,
1986); SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,991
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986); SEC v. Wilkis, 18 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 962 (S.D.N.Y. July 1,
1986); SEC v. Sokolow, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 962 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1986); SEC v.
Levine, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,761 (S.D.N.Y. June 5,
1986); SEC v. Thayer, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 841 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 1985).
Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. 78u(d) (1984), to
discourage insiders from using material nonpublic information. Another statute, the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, recently was
passed, creating still stronger penalties against insider trading. See Goelzer, Legislative
Developments in the 100th Congress Affecting the Work of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, ALI-ABA, NINTH ANNUAL SOUTHERN FEDERAL SECURITIES INSTITUTE 272,
286-87 (1989) (discussing the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988).
This enactment, among other things, doubles the maximum prison sentence for insider trading
from five years to ten years and increases the maximum criminal fine from $100,000 to $1
million for individuals, and from $500,000 to $2.5 million for corporations and partnerships.
Id. at 286. The statute also empowers the SEC to seek treble damages from employers who fail
to properly supervise employees who engage in insider trading. Id. Moreover, under the new
law, the SEC is free to create a bounty program to reward informants whose assistance leads to
insider trading penalties. Id. The bounty could be as much as 10% of the fines imposed. Id.
127. See Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An
Empirical Investigation, 4 J. FIN. 855 (1981).
128. Id. at 866.
129. Id. Most of the remaining market reaction occurs on the day of disclosure, with only
5% occurring the following day. Id.
130. Jensen and Ruback attack Keown and Pinkerton's findings on the basis that the latter
disregard the "plausible alternative hypothesis" that price changes are caused by responses to
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Because of extensive insider trading, investors' fortunes depend
on how early they discover the negotiations and the extent to which
they draw accurate conclusions from increased market activity. The
earlier that disclosures are made or required, the less time that insid-
ers will have to capitalize on their nonpublic information. Although
Basic provided the foundation for earlier disclosure requirements, the
Basic probability/magnitude materiality standard will not impede sig-
nificantly insider trading because this standard is fact sensitive and
will vary from case to case. As a result, the amount of time insiders
will have to act on their nonpublic information will not be limited in
every case, and the SEC will not have the benefit of bright-line
enforcement guidelines.
A potential problem, one that still exists after Basic, arises when
an issuer knows of negotiations that are not yet material, but
purchases the stock knowing or speculating that the merger, or at
least the announcement of negotiations, will eventually and dramati-
cally impact the stock price.' Although such "informed specula-
tion" may be considered legal, it is hypocritical to suggest that the
information giving rise to such speculation truly is not material.
V. DISCLOSURE: IS A MARRIAGE OF FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENT
MARKETS POSSIBLE?
Stock price fluctuations generally can be explained by the effi-
cient capital market theory. 32 Under this theory, the capital markets
public information that increase the probability of a takeover. Jensen & Ruback, supra note
18, at 14 n.6. Jensen and Ruback contend that an announcement of a merger or acquisition is
not a one-day event, but rather a series of events increasing the probability of a takeover.
Jensen and Ruback's position also has been questioned:
Up until about two weeks before the public announcement, [their] conclusion
seems warranted. It is unlikely, however, that public information would produce
the dramatic price increases and abnormal returns that take place for two weeks
prior to disclosure.
Furthermore, even if effective public announcement is prolonged over
several days, that state of affairs involves a significant amount of unfairness to
investors who are not in a position to know about events preceding public
disclosure on the national level.
Comment, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 83 n.17.
131. Goelzer, supra note 4, at 977. Goelzer stated: "[I]f the merger negotiations are not
material (the company, at least as a matter of Rule 10b-5 law) may presumably purchase its
own shares from investors, even though the company is aware of the possibility that the
inchoate merger will dramatically increase the value of those shares." Id.
132. Under the efficient capital market theory, all available public information about a
publicly traded company is reflected fully in the price of its stock. See, e.g., Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (discussing
stock market efficiency). Some commentators believe that investors use all available
information to estimate, and subsequently to bid-up, the value of stock. See Fauma, Efficient
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currently exhibit semi-strong characteristics; that is, stock market
prices reflect an evaluation of all publicly available information. 3' As
a result, the corporate announcement of ongoing merger negotiations
immediately affects the corporation's stock price. Estimating the
value of the potential merged corporation, investors bid the stock
price up or down until it reaches the estimated value, as discounted by
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Friend, The
Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 212 (1972); Note, The
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory, and Regulation of the Securities
Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). Other commentators, however, contend that
investors speculate given increased information signaled by vigorous market activity and, thus,
cause volatile swings in the price of stock. See Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets,
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Wang, Some
Arguments that the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 341 (1986).
Gilson and Kraakman suggest that it is desirable for capital markets to act efficiently.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra, at 549-50. They explain that, in an efficient market, if companies
freely disclose information, stocks are neither over or undervalued because investors bid up or
down the stock price based on predictions made from publicly available information. Id. As
more or conflicting information is released, stock prices are affected incrementally. Id. These
moderate shifts in stock value allow individual investors sufficient time to evaluate new
information and make investment decisions to buy, sell, or hold particular securities. When
material information is announced at one time, rather than gradually, the market reacts with
volatility to the latest information. With wide swings in stock price, individual investors lose
confidence in the market and, consequently, place less of their resources in the market. With a
decreased influx of capital, companies have less funds available to finance current operations or
expansion. Id. at 609-26. Moreover, when investment funds are not readily available, interest
rates increase, thus reducing the capacity of the entire economy. Id.
133. Efficient market theorists describe the capital market response to information in three
ways. First, under the "weak form," the market reflects only historical price data. Fauma,
supra notes 132, at 388. Second, a "semi-strong form" reflects all publicly available
information. Id. Third, a "strong form" reflects all public and nonpublic information. Id.
In a semi-strong form market, for example, if a company has discovered but has not
disclosed a new lower cost manufacturing process, but has announced the signing of new
profitable production contracts, the stock price will increase based solely on the public
information of the profitable contracts. The manufacturing process, not known by the public
market, will not affect the stock price. If the strong form efficient market theory were valid,
the disclosure of pretakeover activity would be inconsequential because all information, public
and nonpublic, already would be efficiently reflected in the capital market. That is, by the time
the information can be disseminated, it already has been reflected in the price of the stock.
Studies of the strong form have demonstrated that the market has semi-strong characteristics
rather than strong. If capital markets truly operate under the semi-strong form, possessors of
market trends or inside information trade at a distinct advantage. See Fischel, Efficient
Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender
Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (1978); Seligman, supra note 74, at 4 n.22. Additionally, the
Supreme Court of the United States implicitly adopted the semi-strong form of the Efficient
Capital Market Theory:
An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in
reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available
information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public
material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule
lOb-5 action.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 991-92 (1988).
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the possibility that the merger will not be consummated. 3 4  Put
another way, stockholders and purchasers base their investment deci-
sions upon the "total mix"' 35 of publicly available information.
Merger negotiations are a crucial component of this "total mix."
When companies merge, the stock value of the target company
typically increases substantially, reflecting the perceived greater abil-
ity of the merged corporation to utilize combined resources and create
higher earnings. '36 The highest bidder in the battle for corporate con-
trol-individual investors, market professionals, insurance compa-
nies, other institutional funds, or corporate raiders-realizes this
synergy. Once merger negotiations are rumored or announced, buy-
ers, often market professionals, assume the risk that negotiations may
fail when they purchase target company stock from individual inves-
tors. 137 When negotiations are disclosed, current stockholders are
given the opportunity to evaluate the new information and the option
of either selling their stock at the premerger escalated price or not
selling if they anticipate further increases in the market price.
In the absence of disclosure, an individual investor who is una-
ware of any rumors may forgo a potential takeover premium by pre-
maturely selling his stock. By purchasing shares from these
uninformed investors, insider traders bid up the price of the stock.
Subsequently, market professionals either who notice the increased
stock activity or who may be in possession of nonpublic information
134. See Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 51
(1983); Brown, supra note 44, at 148 n.205.
135. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
136. Jensen and Ruback explain that there are various sources of increased value created by
takeovers:
Potential reductions in production or distribution costs, often called synergies,
could occur through realization of economies of scale, vertical integration,
adoption of more efficient production or organizational technology, increased
utilization of the bidder's management team and reductions of agency costs by
bringing organization-specific assets under common ownership.
Jensen & Ruback, supra note 18, at 23 (citations omitted). Notwithstanding the various theo-
retical benefits of synergy value, commentators are not in agreement as to whether these bene-
fits of synergy actually are realized. Compare Shay, Setting the 'Right'Premium in an Efficient
Market, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Spring 1981, at 23 (asserting that improvements to the
combined cash flows of two firms in excess of the simple sum can be attributed to more efficient
utilization of corporate assets and resources) with Penn, Premiums.- What Do They Really
Measure?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Fall 1981, at 33 (concluding that the increased value
that investors perceive in the target firm is only an accounting result from increased informa-
tion known about the target company). Yet, when initial takeover bids are made, analysts'
consensus earnings forecasts for any group of takeover targets does not change significantly.
Pound, The Information Effects of Takeover Bids and Resistance, 22 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 226
(1988). This finding is consistent with the synergy view of merger value and inconsistent with
the proposition that firms are undervalued due to a lack of information.
137. Asquith, supra note 134, at 51.
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also capitalize on individual investors' lack of knowledge by purchas-
ing shares. Individual investors sell because the stock price is inflated
due to purchases by insiders and market professionals. Insiders and
market professionals are willing to pay the elevated price because they
expect higher returns based on the undisclosed information. As a
result, individual investors who make an uninformed decision to sell
their stock forgo a potential takeover premium.
An early disclosure policy, however, would not be without
problems. Investor protection in the form of early, full disclosure, for
example, creates costs that directly reduce the return of all corporate
shareholders."'3 Additionally, forcing a corporation and all its share-
holders to. incur the financial burden associated with disclosure may
not be justified by protecting those investors who may sell prema-
turely.' 39 Under a free market philosophy, affording protection to
those who suffer losses may not justify imposing costs on those who
do not. In any event, individual investors may not even utilize the
additional information.
The latter portion of this Comment examines late, early, and
intermediate disclosure models and attempts to identify the costs and
benefits of each. Only by balancing the interests of corporate manag-
ers, market professionals, and individual investors can one find a
sound marriage of fairness and free, efficient markets. The ideal dis-
closure system is one that is consistent with the legislative intent of
full disclosure and addresses the need for clear management guide-
lines and corporate efficiency. Under such a system, market profes-
sionals and corporate managers would continue to be allowed to
operate efficiently, but without an unfair informational advantage.
A. Disclose When an Agreement-In-Principle is Reached
Prior to Basic, many courts"4 considered preliminary merger
negotiations immaterial as a matter of law until there was "an agree-
ment in principle encompassing fundamental terms,"'' that is, until
the price and structure of the transaction had been determined.4 2
138. For a discussion of the costs associated with disclosure and their impact on corporate
earnings, see infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. See also Alchian & Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
139. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976) (discussing costs and benefits of additional
market information).
140. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
141. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1215 (1985).
142. Id. at 757; see Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming the
price and structure rule).
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Corporate managers preferred this late disclosure standard because it
was a bright-line rule easily comprehended and followed, and because
it was one that ordinarily allowed negotiations to be concealed from
investors and speculators.14 3
1. BENEFITS
Requiring disclosure of negotiations only after an agreement-in-
principle has been reached protects investors and facilitates transac-
tions. This higher threshold of materiality protects investors from an
avalanche of inconclusive information and from market gyrations
caused by speculation based on tentative information. The agree-
ment-in-principle standard also allows a target and a suitor to negoti-
ate in privacy without public reaction driving up the price of the
target shares during the negotiations phase of the transaction.
a. Protects Individual Investors from an Avalanche of Information
Not all information regarding corporate developments is useful.
Indeed, some information is of "dubious significance.""' Individual
investors and market professionals cannot digest effectively an abun-
dance of meaningless corporate information. 145 Thus the Basic Court
was careful not to set too low a threshold of materiality when adopt-
ing the probability/magnitude test.' 46 The Court recognized that too
low a "minimum standard might bring an overabundance of informa-
tion within its reach, and lead management 'simply to bury the share-
holders in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that is hardly
conducive to informed decisionmaking.' "147 By providing a higher
threshold of materiality before disclosure is required, the agreement-
in-principle standard avoids this surfeit of often useless information.
b. Reduces Speculative Investing
Although, in theory, increased information should lead to wiser,
more efficient investment choices, 148 several commentators have sug-
143. It may be suggested that corporate managers prefer to conceal takeover negotiations in
order to facilitate a merger and to prevent speculative investors from driving the price of the
target company beyond the reach of the suitor. This proposition should not take into account,
however, that disclosing takeover negotiations may maximize the return to target company
shareholders by attracting other suitors who may be willing to pay more for control of the
target company. For a discussion of the bidding war for control of RJR Nabisco, Inc., see
supra notes 37, 118 and infra note 187.
144. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976).
145. Id. at 448-49.
146. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988).
147. Id. (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
148. See supra notes 132-34. and accompanying text.
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gested that disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations creates inef-
ficient, volatile price swings by misleading the public as to perceived
corporate activity. 4 9 In today's market, extraordinarily high take-
over premiums motivate individual investors and market profession-
als to speculate vigorously in the stock of takeover candidates before
or just after the announcement of a possible transaction.' 5 ° When
preliminary merger negotiations are announced, some investors bid
up the price of the stock as if the deal had been finalized. By reacting
to rumors or news of potential combinations, speculators create vola-
tile price swings by overpricing stock. Later, if there are any indica-
tions that the takeover may not be consummated, speculators dump
their shares hoping to limit their losses. Therefore, with the present
market thirst for discovering takeovers and other similar transactions,
disclosure of preliminary merger or acquisition negotiations may lead
to less, rather than more, efficient capital markets.'
This quest for finding "deals" creates short-term speculation for
stock premiums, rather than placing emphasis on a corporation's
long-term prospects. Reserving the announcement of merger negotia-
tions until the price and structure of the transaction have been deter-
mined prevents buyers from treating preliminary negotiations as
finalized and thus from investing speculatively.'52 Consequently, if
negotiations were to collapse, investors would not be injured by hav-
ing purchased rumor-inflated stock.' 53
149. See Hazen, supra note 85, at 956-57 ("The short-term emphasis on the takeover,
corporate restructuring, and going private markets, combined with investor's ignorance as to
takeovers and mergers in their early planning stages, has led to volatile markets that are
significantly affected by rumors."); Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 73, at 925 ("[A]
premature public pronouncement might quash the deal or mislead the investing public as to
likely corporate activity.").
150. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. A release of information about a tentative plan may disrupt the market by encouraging
uninformed speculation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Staffin v.
Greenberg stated:
Those persons who would buy stock on the basis of the occurrence of preliminary
merger discussions preceding a merger which never occurs, are left "holding the
bag" on a stock whose value was inflated purely by an inchoate hope. If the
announcement is withheld until an agreement in principle on a merger is
reached, the greatest good for the greatest number results. If the merger occurs,
all of the company's shareholders usually benefit; if no merger agreement is
reached, the stock performs as it would have in any event.
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (3d Cir. 1982).
153. In practice, however, inefficient markets are already being created because people
currently trade on rumors. For a discussion of the lack of absolute confidentiality of
negotiations, see supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text, and for a discussion of current
market inefficiencies and the semi-strong form characteristics, see supra notes 132-33 and
accompanying text.
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c. Preserves Confidentiality Preventing a Bidding War for the
Stock of the Target Company
Under the business judgment rule, corporate managers are
afforded wide discretion to control the disclosure of nonpublic infor-
mation.1 -4 The only caveat is that managers must act reasonably and
have a legitimate business rationale.'55 Prior to "an agreement in
principle encompassing fundamental terms,"15 6 merger negotiations
are "inherently fluid and ... shrouded in uncertainty."' 57 Premature
disclosure may mislead investors or disrupt a potential deal.151 Suitor
companies fear that, if merger negotiations are revealed, speculators
will bid up the stock price of the target company, 159 possibly placing
the target company on the auction block and out of the financial reach
of the suitor. 160 Confidential negotiations arguably are crucial both to
154. See, e.g., Wander, Timely Disclosure After Basic, 21 REV. SEC. & COM. REG. 109, 111
(1988), reprinted in ALI-ABA, NINTH ANNUAL SOUTHERN FEDERAL SECURITIES
INSTITUTE 50, 52 (1989) (discussing materiality and the balance between timely disclosure and
the business judgment rule).
155. ALI-ABA, NINTH ANNUAL SOUTHERN FEDERAL SECURITIES INSTITUTE 52 (1989).
In considering how the business judgment rule affects timely disclosure, one commentator
explained:
The judiciary recognizes that to require absolute and immediate disclosure of all
material information concerning crucial corporate developments may often
undermine corporate success. Therefore, the courts have left the timing of
disclosure largely to the discretion and business judgment of management. The
nondisclosure decisions share an underlying premise that issuers act reasonably
and have some legitimate reason for delaying disclosure: e.g., an earlier
announcement would risk losing a valuable corporate opportunity.
Id.
156. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that merger
negotiations need not be disclosed until an agreement is reached on the price and the structure
of the transaction).
157. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Reiss v. Pan
American World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)).
158. See Heublein, 742 F.2d at 757.
159. For a discussion of how speculators bid up the target company's stock, see Asquith,
supra note 134, at 51.
160. One example was the monumental auction for control of RJR Nabisco. For a review
of the suitors and their escalating bids, see supra notes 37, 118 and infra note 187.
Additionally, Freund commented:
It's a jungle out there!
So, how do lawyers (and others charged with getting deals done) operate
today in the public-acquisition area? In a nutshell, they negotiate in private in
order to arrive at a point where, when the world finds out something's
happening, it's as close to a done deal as possible-with the undone parts getting
taken care of posthaste. Put another way, the overriding goal of the parties is to
make it very tough for anyone to crash the party.
Freund, supra note 38, at 13, col. 3.
Putting a target company up for public auction, however, does not necessarily harm the
shareholders' interests. Although the specific transaction with the original suitor becomes less
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the ultimate success of the takeover negotiations and to minimizing
acquisition costs. 1 6 1
2. COSTS
a. Individual Shareholders Unwittingly Sell
Market professionals and individual investors compete for take-
over premiums. 162 Individual investors, not having the benefit of
extensive in-house research, are unaware of many corporate develop-
ments, including takeover discussions. Market professionals, employ-
ing in-house research and privy to some nonpublic information, are
aware of such corporate developments and thus have an advantage
over individual investors. 163 Under a late disclosure model, such as
the agreement-in-principle standard, arbitrageurs and insiders are
afforded ample time to capitalize on their informational advantage.
As a result, uninformed investors are exploited; they sell without
knowing that the stock price may increase significantly due to subse-
quent takeover activity.
164
b. Investors Lose Confidence in the Market
Fear of investor exploitation erodes confidence in the securities
markets. 165 Investors, especially those of moderate financial means,
likely to be consummated, new bidders entering the arena often are willing to pay more to the
target shareholders. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
161. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 126-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that an issuer is not required to
disclose information until it makes a good faith determination that the information is material
and ripe for publication).
162. For an empirical study of this competition, see Hamilton, supra note 44, at 294.
Hamilton estimates that, when a takeover is finally complete, 60% to 90% of company shares
are tendered by arbitrageurs who, having gained an informational advantage through in-house
research, have purchased the stock from individual investors. Id.
163. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 132, at 572.
164. Id. at 579-89.
165. The American Bar Association, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
recognizes the damage that the fear of insider trading and other forms of exploitation could
cause:
In our society, we traditionally abhor those who refuse to play by the rules, that
is, the cheaters and the sneaks. A spitball pitcher, or a card shark with an ace up
his sleeve, may win the game but not our respect. And if we know such a person
is in the game, chances are we won't play. These commonsense observations
suggest that two of the traditional bases for prohibitions against insider trading
are still sound: the "fair play" and "integrity of the markets" arguments. The
first relies on the basic policy that cheating is wrong and on the traditional
sympathy for the victim of the cheat. The second rests on the oft-repeated
argument that people will not entrust their resources to a marketplace they don't
believe is fair, any more than a card player will put his chips on the table in a
poker game that may be fixed .... [I]f investors do not anticipate fair treatment,
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withdraw their capital from the market when they fear they may be
exploited by better-informed traders.166 If less capital flows into the
securities markets, corporations will be forced to borrow funds to
finance their expansion plans. This competition for limited funds will
drive up interest rates and be detrimental to the economy as a
whole. 67
A late disclosure standard will only exacerbate current erosion of
investor confidence. In fact, many investors may withdraw from the
securities markets solely from feeling, in this time of golden
they will avoid investing in securities. As a result, capital formation through
securities offerings will become less attractive and more difficult.
ABA, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation
of Insider Trading, Part I: Regulation Under the Anti-fraud Provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 227-28 (1985).
166. Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470, 477-78 (1969). Although this
argument seems intuitively sound, because it is based on subjective investment behavior and
motivations of individual investors, there is no empirical evidence to support the practical
validity of this theory. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, supra note 69, at 693 ("All we can say is that after fifty years, the
proponents of regulation have no scientifically-accepted evidence of a favorable cost-benefit
ratio for any disclosure rule that rests on the benefits of ... increasing confidence."); Manne,
Insider Trading and the Law Professors, supra note 64, at 577 ("[T]he public has never shown
any signs of losing confidence in the stock market because of the existence of insider trading.").
Cf Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets.: Who is
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227 (1981)
("[I]nvestors already disregard a large body of evidence indicating that it is difficult for even
the most sophisticated institutions to outperform the stock market averages.") [hereinafter
Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets].
Although it is empirically difficult to measure the effect that investor confidence has on
general market conditions, Professors Klein and Bawa find that individual investors, in
comprising their personal portfolios, tend to purchase securities about which they believe there
is sufficient public information. Klein & Bawa, The Effect of Limited Information and
Estimation Risk on Optimal Portfolio Diversification, 5 J. FIN. EcoN. 89, 91-92 (1977).
Consequently, in the context of promoting liquidity in the securities markets, mandatory
disclosure should help investors feel confident that they have and will receive timely, relevant
information concerning any security that they may purchase.
167. Mendelson, Book Review, supra note 166, at 477-78. The increased cost of capital
comes from three different sources. First, Mendelson contends that individual investors,
fearing exploitation by insider traders, create a shortage of investment capital and drive up
interest rates when they withdraw from either a specific corporation or the securities market
generally. Id. Second, Professor Brundy asserts that some market participants, instead of
refraining from investing in the market, will incur substantial, investigatory costs to ensure
that they are not investing in a corporation whose directors trade on nonpublic information.
Brundy, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Law,
93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 355-56 (1979). Third, when market-makers lose confidence and try to
protect themselves from the presence of insider trading, the bid-ask spread of a corporation's
stock will increase, raising the share price and lowering the return to investors. See Seyhun,
supra note 47, at 109-91. For a further explanation of how numerous factors, including
investor exploitation, affect the flow of capital into the markets, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 132, at 549.
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parachutes, 68 that they have not been treated fairly.- Although indi-
vidual investors could seek alternative investments or place their
money in mutual funds, 169 Congress never intended to limit participa-
tion in the securities markets to insiders and market professionals.' 0
168. A golden parachute is a lucrative contract that usually provides corporate executives
with additional benefits in case the company is taken over and the executives are forced to, or
voluntarily, leave the target company. A golden parachute may include stock options,
generous severance pay, or a bonus payable at the end of the executive's employment at the
company. F. Ross Johnson, for example, the ex-president and CEO of RJR Nabisco, received
$25.7 million in cash and securities under KKR's $25.07 billion offer. Morris, Defeated RJR
Chief Johnson Won't Be Short of Consolations, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at A10, col. 5 (For
several years, Mr. Johnson will receive "his salary and bonuses, which totaled $1,736,700 last
year, through the end of 1991. [. . and his] retirement benefits, starting January 1, 1992.").
Id.
169. See, e.g., Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, supra note 64, at 578.
Professor Manne explains that individual investors do not need to directly participate in the
securities markets:
It is [a] questionable assumption that there is some clear social interest in having
people channel their savings into investments in the stock market. Of course,
stock exchanges, brokers, and underwriters are benefited by any encouragement a
government agency can give their particular efforts, but that is not necessarily
true for the public. Any savings will eventually become invested, and the money
does not have to be channeled through the stock market to effect this.
Commercial banks or any number of other intermediaries might serve as well....
In principle, at least, the SEC should be indifferent to whether the public prefers
stock savings accounts or mutual funds to brokers.
Id.
170. Instead of allowing insiders and market professionals to allocate informational rights
in a laissez-faire, free market, Congress, in creating the 1934 Act, was particularly concerned
with ensuring the integrity of market prices of securities so that individual investors could have
sufficient confidence to enter the market:
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges
without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the
securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and open public market is built
upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair
price of a security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as
nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the
true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important
information obstructs the operation of the market as indices of real value. There
cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
In Basic, the Supreme Court echoed the congressional intent to heighten market integrity
and investor confidence. Specifically, in adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Court
gave paramount importance to individual investors' reliance on, and thus confidence in, securi-
ties prices and the market:
In drafting the [1934] Act, Congress expressly relied on the premise that securi-
ties markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an
investor's reliance on the integrity of those markets .... [I]t is hard to imagine
that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who
would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game? ... An investor who
buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integ-
rity of that price.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 991-92 (1988) (citations omitted). Consequently, by
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Disclosure rules that seek to equate access to information among all
investors are instrumental in trying to overcome these problems.
B. Early, Full Disclosure of Preliminary Takeover Discussions
Under a standard of early, full disclosure of preliminary negotia-
tions, corporate developments, such as takeover discussions, would be
announced to the public as soon as they occur. Companies could no
longer delay disclosure until an agreement-in-principle is reached.
This Section will analyze the costs and benefits associated with early,
full disclosure.
1. BENEFITS
Early, full disclosure is beneficial because it promotes more
informed decisionmaking by investors and heightens public confi-
dence in the securities markets. Under the efficient market theory,
when individual investors and market professionals are provided with
a steady stream of current information, stock prices progressively
reflect such information.' The unfettered flow of information
reduces volatile price swings. With less market volatility due to
reduced insider trading or market professional speculation, investor
confidence is renewed. Consequently, more liquidity is provided to
the capital markets by the influx of individual investor
participation. 2
a. Investors Intelligently Evaluate Risk'
Under a system of early, full disclosure, stockholders are
presented with all the information that may affect the value of their
stock. Under the pre-Basic agreement-in-principle disclosure rules, as
merger plans are disclosed, the stock price of a target company rises
to the amount of the expected premium, discounted by the risk that
the deal may not materialize. 73 Evaluating the risks associated with
preliminary negotiations merely means employing an even greater dis-
count factor than the one used in estimating the strength of agree-
allowing an investor's reliance on the integrity of a security's market price to be presumed, the
Court implicitly rejected creating "property rights" in nonpublic information and intended to
heighten market integrity and investor confidence so that individual investors may directly
participate in the stock market.
171. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 132 & 165-70 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 179-81 and
accompanying text.
173. Asquith, supra note 134, at 51.
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ments-in-principle. Both courts174 and commentators 175 agree that
investors can responsibly evaluate information. In Flamm v. Eber-
stadt,176 for example, Judge Easterbrook stated:
[It is wrong to believe that] .. .disclosure may confuse investors
rather than illuminate their choices .... It assumes that investors
are nitwits, unable to appreciate-even when told-that mergers
are risky propositions up until the closing. . . . To attribute to
investors a child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabil-
istic significance of negotiations, implies that they should not be
told about new plants, new products, new managers, or any of the
other changes in the life of a corporation. 17
7
The 1933 and 1934 Acts were intended to protect investors not
from their alleged lack of financial sophistication, but from fraudulent
misrepresentations inducing the purchase of stock.1 78  Individual
investors should be considered able to accurately assess disseminated
corporate information. Under a system of early, full and complete
disclosure, rather than delayed or incomplete announcements, stock
prices should react more moderately and thus more efficiently.
b. Inspires Investor Confidence and Market Integrity
In the wake of the market crash of 1987,17 investors withdrew
much of their savings portfolios from the stock market and sought
alternative investments.18 0  To ensure that investors eventually rein-
174. See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987) (Individual
investors are sophisticated and can intelligently evaluate risk.).
175. Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 73, at 923. Steinberg and Goldman suggest:
Attempting to protect the investing public ...may be unduly paternalistic.
Rather, unless it can be argued that sufficient business justification for
maintaining confidentiality is shown, all significant company and market
information within an issuer's knowledge should be disseminated to the public in
order to facilitate informed decision making and-market reaction. Investors and
financial professionals should not be denied important information merely
because the unsophisticated might attach too much weight to it.
Id. at 925-26.
176. 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987).
177. Id. at 1175.
178. See Mofsky, supra note 24, at 1-3 (describing historical events that gave rise to
securities regulation).
179. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Stock Portfolio suffered a 22.6% loss
in value, falling 508 points from 2246.74 to 1738.74. Metz, Murray, Ricks & Garcia, Stocks
Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
180. Small investors are withdrawing from the stock market in search of more stable
investment vehicles. Anders & McMurray, Taking Stock: Changes Since Crash Can't Prevent
a Repeat, But Might Soften One, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1988, at Al, col. 6. The Wall Street
Journal reported: "Though [individual investors] ...still account for about 60% of U.S.
stockholdings, they are dropping out of daily trading, leaving that to Wall Street Firms and
their big institutional clients. According to the Securities Industry Association, individuals
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vest in the stock market and provide capital through stock ownership,
the perception of the integrity of the securities markets must be
enhanced and preserved through accurate and complete issuer disclo-
sure. If individual investors "cannot rely upon the accuracy and the
completeness of issuer statements, they will be less likely to invest,
thereby reducing the liquidity of the securities markets to the detri-
ment of investors and issuers alike."''
2. COSTS
Although an early, full disclosure standard theoretically leads to
more efficient capital markets, there are problems and costs associated
with this standard. Even if negotiations must be disclosed when initi-
ated, it is extremely difficult to determine exactly when negotiations
have, in fact, commenced. Furthermore, the benefits of early, full dis-
closure do not necessarily offset the substantial corporate costs
involved in preparing and disseminating this information.
a. Uncertainty in Defining "Negotiations"
Under an early, full disclosure standard, preliminary negotia-
tions would be revealed when initiated. Yet, as with the definition of
"materiality," there is no universally accepted meaning of the term
"negotiations." For example, at a luncheon, a corporate executive
from Company A may suggest to an executive from Company B the
possibility of considering a merger. No agreement is reached. No
future plans or meetings are arranged. Should that luncheon encoun-
ter be disclosed? What if the executives agree to discuss the possibil-
ity at some undetermined later date? What if they subsequently have
lunch to discuss unrelated business matters, and the subject of a
merger arises again? When do these incidents become ripe for disclo-
sure as "negotiations"?
Perhaps the term "negotiations" is best left undefined.'82
accounted for just 26.9% of daily trading in 1988's first eight months." Id. Although the
withdrawal of individual investors from the stock market can be empirically observed, it is
difficult to differentiate between individuals who withdraw seeking alternative investment
vehicles and those who withdraw due to a lack of confidence in the market.
181. Carnation Release, supra note 100, at T 87,595.
182. The term "negotiations" has been defined in different ways. Under Item 7(a) of
schedule 14D-9, for example, the SEC set forth circumstances constituting negotiations in In
re of Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,006 (June 16, 1986). The SEC stated: "The term 'negotiations' should not
be interpreted in a technical and restrictive manner .... (T]he term 'negotiations' includes not
only final price bargaining, but also applies to substantive discussions between the parties or
their legal and financial advisers concerning a possible transaction." 35 SEC Docket at 1543.
The SEC concluded that discussions constituted "negotiations" in Revlon because "[tihe
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Although managers are in great need of clear guidance, legislative
definitions restrict the courts. Without a specific legislative definition,
courts are free to interpret appropriate contours for the meaning of
"negotiations."''8 3  If not bound by a specific definition, courts will
have flexibility to vary the definition of "negotiations" in accordance
with their interpretation of the original legislative intent favoring dis-
closure of material information.' 84
b. The Burden and Cost of Disclosure
Mandatory disclosure rules force companies to incur disclosure
costs. First, companies must compile, verify, and disseminate infor-
mation and incur printing and mailing costs."8 5 Second, and more
parties had established contact, had begun and concluded their initial reviews of confidential
financial information, had retained counsel to discuss between and among themselves the
structure and timing of the acquisitions, and had discussed the percentage of equity to be
offered." Id.
A similar approach was taken in Carnation. Carnation Release, supra note 100. Material
negotiations were found because "Carnation senior management... knew that one meeting
and several telephone conversations between senior officers of Carnation and Nestle
concerning Nestle's interest in a possible acquisition of Carnation had occurred and another
such meeting was scheduled to occur in two days." Id. at 878.
Additionally, one commentator discussed the problem of determining whether initial
discussions should constitute "negotiations" in SEC filings. The commentator wrote:
May a company properly omit a filing in response to a line item calling for a
disclosure of "negotiations," on the ground that exploratory discussions about
mutual interest in a deal (though not material) had not ripened into
"negotiations"? (If the company made a "no-negotiations" statement, to prevail
on this approach it would have to establish two points-(l) the discussions had
not yet become "negotiations," and (2) the statement made was not a materially
incomplete half-truth.)
Schneider, Soft Information Disclosure-Recent Developments, ALI-ABA, NINTH ANNUAL
SOUTHERN FEDERAL SECURITIES INSTITUTE 95, 179-80 (1989).
183. Similarly, the term "insider trading" has not been legislatively defined. Although
insider trading generally is prosecuted under Sections 10(b) or 14(e) of the 1934 Act, and
under Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 promulgated thereunder, these sanctions and rules do not explain
or use the term "insider trading." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n(e) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5,
240.14e-3 (1986); see generally Comment, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Civil
Penalties Actions: A Post-Tull Examination of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 361 (1989) (discussing how the lack of legislative restrictions enables judges
and juries to play a central role in defining legislation that is extremely broad in application)
[hereinafter Comment, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial].
184. See Comment, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, supra note 183, at 393-97.
185. Meanwhile, due to enforcement efforts regarding a company's failure to disclose
material facts or its announcement of misleading information, the SEC -generates litigation
expenses borne by both the government and the parties appearing before the agency.
Moreover, because of the new Basic probability/magnitude standard, corporations will
incur additional costs defending shareholder suits that allege disclosure violations. See Block
& Hoff, Materiality of Preliminary Merger Negotiations, in BASIC DISCLOSURE: NEW
PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES AFTER THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 3 (1988).
Block & Hoff suggest that the Basic case-by-case approach to determinations of materiality
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significantly, early, full disclosure results in substantial opportunity
costs to corporations because of the increased time that would be
spent by all of the participants in the disclosure process-corporate
executives, lawyers, and staff. Their time would be allocated to the
preparation of disclosure documents rather than to other corporate
affairs. Even excluding opportunity costs, two economists estimate
that American companies incurred over one billion dollars in disclo-
sure expenses in 1980.186 Under an early, full disclosure standard,
these costs, in addition to the costs of failed mergers due to a lack of
confidentiality and bidding wars, would proliferate. 8 7
C. Intermediate Disclosure Options and Alternatives
Other disclosure models embody attributes of both early and
delayed disclosure. Instead of disclosing material information, one
such model would have companies maintain secrecy by giving a
response of "no comment" to all inquiries.1 88 Such a "safe-harbor"
response would insulate the corporation from liability by neither con-
may generate costly, protracted legal battles that might have been resolved easily under a
bright-line standard: "[The Court's] holding in Basic may have certain undesirable
consequences. The holdings with respect to materiality and fraud-on-the-market are likely to
encourage litigation and certainly will make its termination short of trial more difficult." Id. at
16.
186. S. Phillips & J. Zecher, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 27-51 (1981).
187. The escalation of disclosure costs is a reasonable assumption. No empirical estimates
have been made to estimate corporate expenses incurred under an early, full disclosure
standard.
With regard to the costs and benefits of placing a company up for public auction, there
has been much debate. One philosophy suggests that putting a target company up for public
auction does not necessarily harm anyone's interests. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers. A Last (?) Reply, 2 J. LAW, ECON. & ORGANIZATION 253 (1986);
Bebchuk, The Casefor Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 23 (1985); Bebchuk, The Casefor Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1028 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Gilson, Seeking Competing Bids Versus
Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defenses, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982). Although the specific
transaction with the original suitor becomes less likely to be consummated, new bidders
entering the arena often are willing to pay more to the target shareholders.
Another school of thought suggests that, although competing bids maximize the benefit
and return to target stockholders for a specific transaction, the loss of substantial sunk costs
incurred by the initial suitor will generally discourage bidder firms from entering the arena for
corporate control and especially from making the first offer. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161 (1981). RJR Nabisco shareholders, for example, originally were going to receive $72 per
share under management's initial leveraged buy-out offer. See Burrough & Helyar, Buy-Out
Bluff: How Underdog KKR Won RJR Nabisco Without Highest Bid, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988,
at AI, col. 6. Following a public bidding auction, they ultimately received $108 per share. Id.
188. For a discussion of the "no comment" standard, see infra notes 191-202 and
accompanying text.
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firming nor denying the existence of negotiations. Alternatively, an
affirmative duty to disclose preliminary merger negotiations could
arise either upon the occurrence of certain steps in the negotiating
process 189 or whenever corporate insiders would be prohibited from
trading in company stock because of insider trading prohibitions.' 9°
1. RESPONDING "NO COMMENT" TO ALL INQUIRIES
A suggested alternative to full disclosure is for corporations to
answer "no comment" in response to inquiries made by the
exchanges, securities analysts, the public, and the press.' Prior to
Basic's probability/magnitude materiality standard, courts applying
the various disclosure rules tolerated the injection into the market of
half-truths and misleading information when a corporation concealed
preliminary merger negotiations because the courts viewed the negoti-
ations as immaterial until an agreement-in-principle had been
reached.' 92 Investors reacted to rumors or snippets of information
and often exacerbated market volatility. 193
Permitting safe-harbor "no comment" responses would provide
several benefits to corporate managers, market professionals, and indi-
vidual investors. Corporate managers could answer "no comment" to
avoid liability while continuing negotiations in privacy. 19 This pri-
vacy would further merger efforts by minimizing speculation in the
corporation's stock. 195 Eventually, if the merger were consummated,
either those who were shareholders at the time of the "no comment"
response and who did not sell their shares, or market professionals
who subsequently purchased stock, would realize the merger pre-
mium.' 96 Although the "no comment" rule would benefit corporate
189. For a discussion of the standard that would require disclosure upon the occurrence of
certain events common to all takeovers, see infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of the standard that would require disclosure at the point at which
insider trading sanctions are triggered, see infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 85, at 954-55 (discussing benefits of a "no comment"
standard).
192. For a discussion of the duty to correct misleading statements and the lack of an
affirmative duty to disclose preliminary merger negotiations, see supra notes 4, 97 and
accompanying text.
193. See Hazen, supra note 85, at 961 ("[A]ny disclosure has the potential for being
received by the market more optimistically than warranted because of the current unlimited
thirst for takeover candidates.").
194. Id. at 972.
195. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If by hypothesis silence is
the best course for investors, then it may be necessary to condone evasive answers ... to put
pursuers off the scent for a time.").
196. For an empirical review of the competition for stock premiums among individual
investors, see Hamilton, supra note 44, at 294.
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managers and risk arbitrageurs, it would provide no protection to
individual stockholders. Some investors, unaware of the existence of
ongoing merger negotiations, might sell their shares to keen market
professionals and not realize the potential for a merger stock
premium.
"No comment" responses may add to, rather than correct, cur-
rent inefficient market volatility. Traditionally, corporate managers
have attempted to inspire investor confidence and to avoid volatile
stock swings by disclosing significant information whenever possi-
ble.'9 7 Ordinarily, a corporation will reply honestly to inquiries by
the securities exchanges, securities analysts, the public, and the press.
Under a "no comment" standard, however, unless a corporation
answers "no comment" to all questions, an occasional response of "no
comment" will be deemed an admission of merger negotiations, which
could lead to investor speculation.19
In Basic, the Supreme Court stated that a steadfast "no com-
ment" policy regarding merger talks might be considered an accepta-
ble response to inquiries in certain cases: "Silence, absent a duty to
disclose, is not misleading under Rule lOb-5. 'No comment' state-
ments are generally the functional equivalent of silence."' 199 Because
of this statement in the otherwise prodisclosure Basic, companies have
been adopting "no comment" policies to avoid creating a duty to dis-
close.2" Thus, by instituting a "no comment" policy, corporations
that have launched new material developments can avoid making a
public disclosure. As a result, investors have been receiving less infor-
197. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (Many companies
have well-developed publicity relationships with analysts at investment banks to provide
information that will promote the company's stock.).
198. See, e.g., Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1178. In Flamm, the court stated:
Suppose a firm is engaged in negotiations that are best kept quiet, and the
Exchange asks whether new developments account for activity in its stock. If the
firm says yes and says why, the cat is out of the bag; if the firm says no, it faces
liability for fraud; if the firm says "no comment" that is the same thing as saying
"yes" because investors will deduce the truth. No corporation follows the CIA's
policy of saying "no comment" to every inquiry; every firm regularly confirms or
denies rumors, as the securities laws and the stock exchanges' rules require. The
exchanges' rules require a response, not a refusal to respond, to inquiries.
Id.
199. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct 978, 987 n.17 (1988). Although certain information
may be material, there also must be a specific duty to disclose before a corporation must make
a public announcement. See supra notes 4, 97 and accompanying text.
200. Before an obligation to disclose information arises, a corporation must be under a duty
to disclose, and the information must be material. See supra notes 4, 97 and accompanying
text. By adopting a "no comment" policy, a corporation can avoid announcing information
that is nonetheless material.
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mation than under the pre-Basic rules.2"'
Although a "no comment" standard is a clear guideline which
would limit manager liability under the Securities Acts, this standard
should be rejected for three reasons: 1) investor speculation based on
occasional "no comment" responses conflicts with the corporate
objectives of building investor confidence and market efficiency; 2)
investors will make less informed investment decisions with less avail-
able public information; and 3) the "no comment" standard, by
allowing corporate managers to conceal important information, con-
travenes the congressional intent of full disclosure.2 °2
2. BASING DISCLOSURE ON THE OCCURRENCE OF CERTAIN
EVENTS COMMON TO ALL TAKEOVERS
Alternatively, the requirement of disclosure of preliminary dis-
cussions could be triggered by events common to the negotiating pro-
cess of all mergers and acquisitions. In determining the probability
that a merger will occur, for example, the Basic Court suggested sev-
eral factors that could serve as indicia of an intent to merge: "board
resolutions, instructions to investment bankers, and actual negotia-
tions between principals or their intermediaries. "203 Although not
mentioned by the Court, the sharing of confidential information or
projections between suitor and target companies could also serve to
trigger the requirement of disclosure. When any two of the above
events have occurred, for example, the negotiations could be deemed
material, and a rebuttable presumption could be created in favor of
disclosure.2°
201. Many managers have been adopting "no comment" policies and providing less
information to investors:
I defer to lawyers in such things [as disclosure], but the implication to us is that
there is a definite need to take the information content out of the corporate
response. We must, in effect, say nothing consistently in all related situations
until the lawyers tell us to do otherwise. When we say no comment, it should not
have information significance.
Roundtable, supra note 112, at 24 (quoting Michael Seely, President of Investor Access Corp.).
"In my opinion, [a disclosure policy] should be a consistent policy and it should not give any
information." Id. (quoting Neil Call, Executive Vice President of D.F. King & Co.).
202. It should be noted that the current industry trend is heading dangerously toward
instituting "no comment" public relations programs which give little information, but reduce
corporate liability. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
203. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 987 (1988). But cf Reiss v. Pan American
World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding not material a merger resolution by
Pan Am's board of directors).
204. Alternatively, in order to avoid speculation and market volatility, rather than
announce that a merger possibility exists upon the occurrence of one of the "materiality"
signals, corporate managers could reveal only the particular step achieved. Investors could use
the knowledge of the specific development to gauge for themselves the probability that the
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A disclosure rule triggered by specific events is appealing. Man-
agers could plan corporate behavior given the clear, bright-line guide-
posts. Additionally, consistent with congressional intent, individual
investors would be informed at an early point in the negotiations and
would be able to make more informed decisions. Market profession-
als and insider traders would have less of an informational advantage
and, consequently, would be less able to exploit individual investors.
3. DISCLOSING AT THE TIME WHEN INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS ARE TRIGGERED
Another alternative would be to require disclosure of preliminary
merger negotiations at the moment when corporate insiders would no
longer be allowed to trade company stock. Specifically, this disclo-
sure convention is based on disclosing information when it becomes
material, regardless of whether or not a duty to disclose has been trig-
gered.2 °5 A corporate fiduciary is prohibited from trading stock based
on inside knowledge of merger negotiations, even of preliminary
merger negotiations.2"6 Like the disclosure requirements of Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, the duty to disclose or to refrain from trading
imposed by the provisions prohibiting insider trading are based on the
legislative principles of parity of information and full disclosure.20 7
Commentators have suggested that, if preliminary merger negotia-
tions trigger insider trading sanctions, then such information should
also be deemed material in determining the appropriate point to dis-
close the information to stockholders or to the market.20 8 Synchro-
nizing the time when disclosure is required with the time when insider
trading sanctions are triggered seems appropriate because both the
disclosure rules and the insider trading sanctions are rooted in the
congressional objective of protecting investors.2"9
transaction will occur. Consequently, the market would evaluate and efficiently reflect the
additional information. See Asquith, supra note 134, at 51. Knowing that these common
events are very tentative indications of a transaction, investors will attribute various, but
larger, discount factors when determining the potential premium associated with a
combination. Using larger discount factors should create more efficient, less volatile markets.
205. Currently, a corporation is under an obligation to disclose information if it is under a
duty to disclose and the information is material. See supra notes 4, 97 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 22 (1980) (holding that based on Rule
10b-5, there is a breach of fiduciary duty and of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, when
insiders trade on material, nonpublic information); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306-07
(2d. Cir. 1974) (holding that there was a breach of fiduciary duty when an insider traded on
material, nonpublic information regarding takeover negotiations).
207. For a discussion of the congressional intent underlying the securities laws, see supra
notes 24-36 & 81-87 and accompanying text.
208. See Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 73, at 927-28.
209. Requiring disclosure at the point when corporate insiders are no longer allowed to
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Absent congressional intervention, the public disclosure of sensi-
tive corporate information is a policy question to be decided by the
courts. With late disclosure, corporate management would be able to
withhold information, negotiate in private, and sometimes trade
shares using nonpublic information. Without speculation spurred by
rumors, late disclosure theoretically would create a less volatile, more
efficient market which would benefit market professionals over indi-
vidual shareholders. Early disclosure, on the other hand, would cre-
ate a market in which everyone trades with the same information,
although with increased market volatility and administrative costs.
D. Summary of Costs, Benefits, and Consequences of Various
Disclosure Standards
In Basic, the Supreme Court rejected the previously accepted
agreement-in-principle standard and adopted a probability/magni-
tude test of "materiality."2 ' Because the Basic test does not provide a
bright-line rule or readily applied criteria, lower courts will have to
clarify the Basic standard which will be used to determine when pre-
liminary negotiations must be disclosed. This Section uses the facts of
SEC v. Shapiro2 I to illustrate the differences between 1) early disclo-
sure, 2) agreement-in-principle disclosure, 3) disclosure made at the
time when insider trading regulations are triggered, 4) a "no com-
ment" policy, and 5) disclosure based on the occurrence of certain
events common to all takeovers.
trade their company's stock has some disadvantages. Although requiring earlier disclosure
would dampen insider trading by limiting the insider's informational advantage, and thus
protect the interests of individual investors, the market professionals would lose the value of,
or receive a lower yield on, their in-house research investment.
Some commentators argue that insider trading is beneficial. See Carlton & Fischel, supra
note 48; Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting, supra note 56; Cox, Insider Trading Regulation
and the Production of Information, supra note 56; Morgan, supra note 48. An indirect means
of information regarding corporate developments benefits the marketplace. Investors benefit
by the prevailing stock price moving in the direction of the actual value. See supra notes 63-65
and accompanying text; see also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 48, at 868. Corporate managers
benefit by being provided with a means of extraordinary compensation for their developmental
efforts on behalf of the enterprise. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 48, at 869-72; Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the
Production of Information, supra note 56, at 475. Finally, corporations benefit because their
shareholders and managers receive these benefits. See H. MANNE, supra note 64; Carlton &
Fischel, supra note 48, at 857; Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, supra note 64;
Morgan, supra note 48, at 79; Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-
Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23 (1977). But see Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price. A
Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967); Wang,
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets, supra note 166.
210. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988).
211. 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Shapiro involved an enforcement action brought by the SEC
against, among others, Harris Shapiro and Norman Berman.212 Sha-
piro and Berman, partners in a firm specializing in arranging corpo-
rate mergers and acquisitions, were accused of trading in stock while
in possession of nonpublic information concerning the existence of
merger negotiations. 2 3 The facts of Shapiro can be summarized as
follows: 2 14
October 1970: Shapiro and Berman began efforts on behalf of
the target company, Ridge Manor Development (Ridge
Manor), to arrange a merger with the suitor, Harvey's
Stores, Inc. (Harvey's).
December 11, 1970: Harvey's rejected the initial proposals made
by Shapiro and Berman.
Late December, 1970: Ridge Manor shared nonpublic informa-
tion with Shapiro to estimate future earnings of merged
companies.
January 6, 1971: 1) The Ridge Manor president, who is the
major shareholder, with Shapiro and Berman, held first
face-to-face negotiations with a director of Harvey's; 2)
Ridge Manor shared with Harvey's the nonpublic informa-
tion given earlier to Shapiro and Berman; 3) Director from
Harvey's indicated that other directors of Harvey's would
oppose the transaction, but that he viewed it as favorable; 4)
Following the meeting, Berman purchased 100 shares of
Harvey's stock at $7.25.215
January 21, 1971: Berman and Shapiro met with several direc-
tors of Harvey's to discuss merger terms.
January 25, 1971:, 1) Harvey's, through Shapiro, offered Ridge
Manor a merger proposal that detailed a specific price and
transaction structure; 2) Following the meeting, Berman
212. Id. at 1301.
213. Id. at 1301-02.
214. The detailed description of the facts can be found in the body of the opinion. Id. at
1303-05.
215. Before an obligation to disclose, information arises, a corporation must be under a
duty to disclose, and the information must be material. See supra notes 4 & 97 and
accompanying text. In the instant case, when Berman purchased stock based on the nonpublic
information given to him directly by and because of his relationship with Ridge Manor, Ridge
Manor was under a duty to disclose the same information to the market. Shapiro, 494 F.2d at
1305. The only unresolved issue that would trigger a disclosure requirement is whether the
information was material. Id. In this case, the finding of materiality would determine when
the public should have become aware of the preliminary negotiations. Yet, if the information
was deemed immaterial, Ridge Manor would not have had to make a disclosure, and Berman
could have traded with impunity.
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purchased 400 shares of Harvey's stock ranging from $7.125
to $7.375.
January 26, 1971: 1) Shapiro contacted a potential financier of
the merger; 2) Berman, through a stock broker, purchased
400 shares of Harvey's stock at $8.50.
January 27, 1971: Stock broker from above made the first of sev-
eral purchases of Harvey's stock for this broker's personal
account.
January 28, 1971: Three members of Harvey's executive com-
mittee met with Shapiro and the financier.
January 29, 1971: 1) Liberty Circle Corp. (Liberty Circle),
another potential target company of Harvey's, adopted an
internal resolution to attempt a merger with Harvey's; 2)
Merger discussions between Liberty Circle and Harvey's
began and continued throughout the following week.
February 5, 1971: A public announcement disclosed that Har-
vey's was conducting merger negotiations with two uniden-
tified companies.
February 8, 1971: Berman sold 600 shares of Harvey's stock at
prices ranging from $18 to $18.75.
February 9, 1971: A "letter of intent" between Harvey's and
Ridge Manor was drafted, but not signed.
February 10, 1971: A public announcement disclosed that Ridge
Manor was one of the companies conducting merger negoti-
ations with Harvey's.
February 16, 1971: Berman purchased 500 shares of Harvey's
stock and two calls at $22.
February 18, 1971: 1) Harvey's reached and announced an
agreement-in-principle with Ridge Manor; 2) Berman
purchased 500 shares of Harvey's stock at prices ranging
from $23.625 to $23.75.
February 24, March 8, and March 9, 1971: Berman sold his
entire Harvey's holdings at prices ranging from $21 to
$22.50.
Mid-March 1971: Ridge Manor questioned the wisdom of the
merger with Harvey's.
April 3, 1971: Harvey's agreed to merge with Liberty Circle.
April 5, 1971: Ridge Manor withdrew from the deal with
216Harvey's.21
216. Subsequently, Shapiro and Berman were charged and convicted of insider trading.
Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1302.
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1. AGREEMENT-IN-PRINCIPLE DISCLOSURE
The judicial definition of "materiality" must create a disclosure
standard that satisfies the legislative objective of full disclosure. The
agreement-in-principle standard is inconsistent with congressional
intent because it generally allows information to be concealed.
In Shapiro, the use of an agreement-in-principle disclosure stan-
dard would not have provided investor protection, would have cre-
ated volatile price swings, and would have allowed insider trading to
proliferate. First, by the time the agreement-in-principle between
Ridge Manor and Harvey's was reached and announced on February
18, individual investors were unaware of five months of ongoing nego-
tiations. Thus these investors may have sold their shares not realizing
the possibility of an eventual merger premium. Second, when the first
news of a merger between Ridge Manor and Harvey's was released on
February 18, the stock price jumped approximately $16.50, or 228%
(February 18 postdisclosure price range of $23.625 to $23.75 over
January 25 predisclosure price range of $7.125 to $7.375). Third, if
not for the fact that Berman was caught for insider trading, the agree-
ment-in-principle standard would have afforded him sufficient time to
capitalize on his knowledge of nonpublic information. 217 Although,
under the agreement-in-principle standard, managers would know
precisely when to issue a public statement, this bright-line rule would
injure investors, cause market inefficiency, and allow insider trading
to flourish.
2. EARLY, FULL DISCLOSURE
Early, full disclosure is consistent with the congressional intent
of full disclosure of information. Yet requiring a corporation to issue
a public statement whenever it enters into "negotiations," directly or
through an agent, is overly burdensome. In Shapiro, under an early,
full disclosure standard, Harvey's may have had to disclose when it
was approached by Shapiro and Berman (October-December 11),
while Ridge Manor would have had to make an announcement either
when it retained Shapiro and Berman (October), or when Shapiro and
Berman, as agents for Ridge Manor, contacted Harvey's (October-
December 11).211
217. Note the trades made on January 6, 25, 26 (note Berman's tip to, and subsequent
trading by, the stock broker), February 8, 16, and 18. Id. at 1304-05. Market professionals
would advocate an agreement-in-principle standard because their in-house research to identify
potential takeover companies relies heavily on market signals provided by increased stock
activity caused by such insider trading. For a discussion of how market specialists react to
market signals called "noise," see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
218. This disclosure is dependent not only on the materiality of the information, but also on
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Requiring disclosure at the onset of any negotiations would have
few benefits and would generate considerable administrative costs
which would have to be paid from corporate earnings. Because public
statements regarding very tentative information would be released so
frequently, individual investors would not be able to practically digest
and utilize the overabundance of information which would be pro-
vided. Although increased information should lead to more informed
investment decisions and more efficient markets, the new increased
information provided under an early, full disclosure standard would
be considerably less reliable.219
If the markets had been flooded with inconclusive statements
regarding potential mergers in Shapiro, investors might have ignored
the corporate disclosure that Ridge Manor had entered into merger
negotiations and, as a result, would have failed to bid up the Ridge
Manor stock from $7.25 (January 6 undervalued price) to approxi-
mately $20 (rough average of the stock price once investors learned of
the potential merging with Harvey's). Although the Liberty Circle
merger was eventually consummated, many investors might have
been injured by treating the public announcements of merger negotia-
tions between Harvey's and Ridge Manor as a finalized deal. Further-
more, under an early, full disclosure standard, investor confusion
would have been exacerbated because there would have been a surplus
of information. Consequently, investors could not have made an
informed investment decision based solely on the ordinarily unreliable
corporate information. Because an early, full disclosure standard
would not provide a reliable source of publicly available information
the existence of a duty to disclose. In the instant case, the duty to disclose did not arise until
January 6 when Berman traded in Ridge Manor stock. This is an example of how the duty
precondition to disclosure acts as a safeguard to premature public statements. For the
purposes of this discussion, however, it will be assumed that both Harvey's and Ridge Manor
were under a prior duty to disclose. It can be assumed, for example, that Harvey's and Ridge
Manor had issued statements denying the existence of merger negotiations, similar to the
statements made in Basic. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 981 (1988).
219. In Shapiro, for example, investors could have been confused by various conflicting
disclosures: "negotiations are taking place" (October-before December 11); "negotiations have
broken down" (December 11); "negotiations are being undertaken again" (January 6).
Additionally, investors would place little value on the disclosed information because
companies would commonly be connected with many possible transactions that never would
be consummated. In Shapiro, following the many disclosures that Harvey's would have been
required to make under an early disclosure standard during its unsuccessful negotiations with
Ridge Manor, investors would not have placed significant value on the disclosure that merger
negotiations existed between Harvey's and Liberty Circle. Investors would become
unresponsive to released information because there would be many announcements linking
Harvey's with several possible merger candidates. Market professionals, however, might be
able to employ their in-house research to evaluate the validity of the information contained in
corporate disclosures by tracking market "noise." See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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regarding possible corporate activities, an erratic, volatile market
would develop due to many different investors reacting to different
pieces of information. Consequently, investor confidence and thus
capital investment in the securities markets would wane.2 2 °
Moreover, an early, full disclosure standard would not be
favored by corporate management. Because there is no clear defini-
tion of when "negotiations" begin, it would be difficult for managers
to determine when a disclosure would have to be made. In Shapiro,
there was no definitive time or action before December 11, 1970 that
would have triggered the requirement of disclosure of negotiations.
Thus, although early, full disclosure is consistent with congressional
intent and may reduce insider trading, this standard would generate
excessive amounts of unreliable information which would harm inves-
tor confidence and market efficiency.
3. A "NO COMMENT" POLICY
The use of a "no comment" policy in response to inquiries is
detrimental because it leads to the withholding of information.
Instead of actively promoting the dissemination of information, as is
congressionally intended, this standard would create a bright-line rule
that shields corporate managers from liability in those circumstances
in which they choose to conceal ongoing negotiations. Because the
facts of Shapiro do not include any inquiries from the public, there is
no difference between the "no comment" policy and that of the agree-
ment-in-principle standard when applied to the facts of Shapiro.22'
There would only be late disclosure. If Berman had not traded in
corporate stock and Harvey's had implemented a "no comment" pol-
icy, it is not clear when Harvey's would have been required to disclose
the pending merger, at least in the period prior to the agreement-in-
principle stage.
4. DISCLOSURE MADE AT THE TIME WHEN INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS ARE TRIGGERED
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Shapiro held that Berman violated Rule lOb-5 by trading on the basis
of nonpublic, material information, without disclosing the informa-
tion to those with whom he traded.222 In examining Berman's first
trade on January 6, the court used the same probability/magnitude
220. An early disclosure standard, however, would virtually eliminate the time during
which insiders could use nonpublic information for their personal benefit.
221. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
222. Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1307.
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"materiality" test that was adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic. 223
Under Basic, if a disclosure announcing preliminary negotiations
were triggered in Shapiro on January 6, investors would have been
protected, efficient capital markets would have prevailed, and insider
trading would have been limited. If informed on January 6 of the
existence of preliminary negotiations, shareholders would have been
able to make an informed decision as to whether to sell or to retain
their Harvey's stock as the merger negotiations progressed. 224  If
investors have more accurate information and can make better
informed decisions, the market price of the stock will be valued more
accurately and, thus, efficiently. 225 Because investors are informed at
an early stage that preliminary merger negotiations are occurring, the
time that insiders can benefit by trading on the basis of nonpublic
information is limited. In Shapiro, if investors had been informed of
negotiations on January 6, investors would have bid up the price of
Harvey's stock based on this new information. Consequently,
Berman would not have been able to purchase Harvey's stock at the
significantly undervalued price of $7.25. Instead, under the efficient
market theory, Berman's insider knowledge would have been worth-
less because the price of Harvey's stock would have reflected
Berman's knowledge at the time the negotiations had been disclosed.
The problem with Basic's (and Shapiro's) probability/magnitude
standard is that its application varies from case to case. For example,
223. Specifically, the Shapiro court stated that the materiality of a future event is
determined by "a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity." Id. at
1305-06.
224. Market professionals would not favor such a disclosure standard. Under a mandatory
disclosure system, the effectiveness of market professionals' in-house research would diminish
as individual investors are provided with, at no direct cost, the same information that gave
market professionals, at great cost, their informational advantage. Free market theorists
would argue that this type of disclosure standard would remove market professionals'
incentive to search for market information that incidentally promotes market efficiency. This
argument ordinarily is persuasive. Yet information concerning takeovers is of such unique
interest and financial significance that the rationales supporting the free market theory are not
applicable. Specifically, mergers and acquisitions are so profitable that market professionals
are rewarded for their informational search based on their trading which occurs solely after a
public announcement. See Larcker & Lys, supra note 47, at 124-25; see also supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
225. There was a dramatic price swing in Harvey's stock on February 5 when merger
negotiations were announced. Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1304-05 (from $8.50 on January 26 to
between $18 to $18.75 on February 8). If these negotiations had been announced on January
6, the day the court determined the information concerning the potential merger became
material, investors over the following three months either would have bid up the stock price as
the merger became more probable or would have let the stock price fall as the merger
agreement fell apart. With increased, reliable information, there would have been a more
gradual movement in the price of the stock.
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in analyzing the magnitude, the Shapiro court found significant a
600% increase in the earnings per share of Harvey's stock.2 26 In
examining the probability of the transaction, the court found impor-
tant the fact that, on January 6, a director of Harvey's reacted favora-
bly to a merger proposal and promised to propose the merger to
Harvey's board. 227 The court, in analyzing Berman's information,
tilted the probability/magnitude test in favor of "materiality" because
of the substantial increase in earnings per share. 228 Another court,
however, may have felt the need for a greater indication that the
merger would be consummated, rather than a mere heart-felt
approval of a corporate manager. As a result, although Harvey's was
under a duty to disclose because Berman was trading stock as of Janu-
ary 6, there might have been no disclosure because the negotiations
may not have been considered material under the probability/magni-
tude test. This test, for example, may have required disclosure on
January 25 when Harvey's expressed its intent to merge by making a
counter offer to Ridge Manor. Still another court may have believed
that the potential premium would have been so substantial that dis-
closure would have been required in early December when the two
companies first entertained, through Shapiro and Berman, the
thought of merging.
This lack of clear, consistent guidelines would inhibit corporate
management. Unsure of their potential liability, corporate managers
would not act in the best interests of their shareholders because they
would be reluctant to enter into takeover negotiations. Although it is
not consistent with the congressional intent of full disclosure, the
agreement-in-principle standard was created and adopted out of the
need to provide managers with easily understood and enforced guide-
lines. Standards that are not in the form of a bright-line rule, like the
probability/magnitude test, fail to provide managers with the flexibil-
ity and freedom necessary to maximize shareholder value by entering
the arena for corporate control.
5. DISCLOSURE BASED ON THE OCCURRENCE OF CERTAIN EVENTS
COMMON TO ALL TAKEOVERS
Disclosure based on the occurrence of certain events common to
all takeovers has the same qualities as disclosure of information based
226. Id. at 1307.
227. Id. at 1306.
228. In balancing the probability and the magnitude, the court said that "[a]lthough the
negotiations had not jelled to the point where a merger was probable, the possibility was not so
remote that, when considered in the light of [the] .. .increase ... in Harvey's earnings per
share, it might not have influenced a reasonable investor." Id. at 1306-07.
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on a probability/magnitude standard, except that the common events
serve as easily identifiable guidelines for management. A list of com-
mon guidelines that could trigger the requirement of disclosure
includes board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers, actual
negotiations between principals or their intermediaries,229 retention of
counsel, arrangements for financing, the signing of a confidentiality
agreement, and the sharing of confidential information or projections.
When any two of the above elements are present, a rebuttable pre-
sumption could be created that negotiations are to be deemed mate-
rial. In Shapiro, the common events test is easily applied: On
January 6, the Ridge Manor president held the first face-to-face nego-
tiations with a director of Harvey's (First Event) and shared nonpub-
lic information concerning Ridge Manor's own projected future
earnings (Second Event). Unlike the varying probability/magnitude
standard, the common events test can be easily followed and enforced.
Consequently, not only does the common events test accord with con-
gressional intent, provide investor protection, and stimulate market
efficiency, it also satisfies the practical concerns of corporate manag-
ers. The common events test comes closest to embodying the ideal
disclosure model.
The following chart summarizes the costs and benefits associated
with each of the disclosure models analyzed in this Comment and
demonstrates the superiority of the common events test:
229. These three common elements were mentioned in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct.
978, 987 (1988).
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DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
COMMON NO INSIDER
EARLY LATE EVENTS COMMENT SANCTIONS
I. CONSISTENT WITH
CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT YES NO YES NO YES
II. MORE INFORMATION
TO THE MARKET
CREATING,..
A) EFFICIENT
MARKETS NO NO YES NO YES
B) INVESTOR
PROTECTION YES NO YES NO YES
C) REDUCED
INSIDER
TRADING YES NO YES NO YES
D) INVESTOR
CONFIDENCE YES NO YES NO YES
III. BRIGHT-LINE RULE
FOR MANAGERS NO YES YES YES NO
IV. MARKET
PROFESSIONALS
HAVE INCENTIVE
TO SEARCH FOR
MARKET
INFORMATION YES YES YES YES YES
VI. CONCLUSION
The congressional intent underlying all securities legislation and
regulations advocates the full disclosure of information to protect
investors.230 In recent years, however, the courts have tolerated
exceedingly late disclosure of vital information. As a result, individ-
ual investors have foregone potential takeover stock price premiums
by prematurely selling their shares to others having an unfair infor-
mational advantage-usually insider traders and market
professionals.
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,231 the Supreme Court held that corpo-
rate managers must disclose material information concerning mergers
and merger negotiations.232 The Court established a probability/mag-
nitude standard of materiality, 233 which may lead to a requirement of
earlier disclosure. Yet, because this standard requires a case-by-case
determination of materiality, it does not provide clear guidelines to
corporate managers. The standard's utility is further undermined by a
230. See supra notes 24-36 & 81-87 and accompanying text.
231. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
232. Id. at 983-84.
233. Id. at 983.
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footnote234 that encouraged many corporate managers to adopt a "no
comment" policy in response to inquiries. When a corporate manager
uses a "no comment" policy to avoid being under a duty to disclose,
public statements will not be required, material information can be
concealed, and investor access to information will be reduced further
than prior to Basic.
For a semi-strong form capital market to operate efficiently and
to avoid dangerous price volatility, there must be a steady stream of
information to the public. Despite the additional administrative costs
incurred in making disclosure, earlier disclosure is consistent with
congressional intent, allows investors to make more informed deci-
sions, and heightens confidence in the market by limiting the predis-
closure time, during which insiders and market professionals can use
their informational advantage at the expense of uninformed individual
investors. Although market professionals have a right to participate
in the securities markets, Congress never intended to establish or to
preserve their timing and informational advantage.
Because the Supreme Court has remanded Basic to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for a determination as to
when merger discussions became material under the facts in Basic,
there is hope that clearer judicial guidelines for managers will be
forthcoming. In considering the possible disclosure conventions, the
"no comment" standard is inadequate because it contravenes the pol-
icy of full disclosure underlying Rule lOb-5. Moreover, to require dis-
closure at the point that dealing in company stock is considered
insider trading fails to provide clear guidelines for corporate manage-
ment. Of all the disclosure standards examined in this Comment,
only disclosure based on the occurrence of certain events common to
every takeover satisfies all competing interests. Indeed, the common-
events test protects individual investors, curbs insider trading, pro-
motes investor confidence, provides managers with a bright-line rule,
and allows for efficient operation of the capital markets.
JAMES HARLAN KOENIG
234. Id. at 987 n.17. See supra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
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